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Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional

Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global
Gilded Age
D. Daniel Sokolt
ABSTRACT: Antitrust has entereda gilded age of increasedinternational
cooperation and enforcement at levels never before seen. Yet, increased
globalization creates challenges to combat international anticompetitive
conduct. PartI introduces the Article. Part 11 provides a briefoverview of the
history of international antitrust. This overview departs from previous
historical analyses as it focuses on participation within each of the
internationalantitrust institutions to explain these historical limitations. Part
111 identifies and explores three case studies which are generally representative
of international antitrust. These case studies have been chosen because the
issues they address have been at the top of the agenda of internationalantitrust
in thepast decade: mergers, cartels, and market access.
Part IV introduces the theoretical tools to address the problems of
internationalantitrust. This Partmakes the analytical case for the application
of comparative institutionalanalysis, an analysis of the choice of the decisionmaking process, to international antitrust. It addresses how a comparative
institutional analysis framework allows for a more complete examination of
both internationaland domestic institutions. It also explains the participation
model as the organizing principle for the analysis of institutions, as
participation affects each institution's ability to create policy remedies. The
second theoreticaltool that PartIV introduces is internationalrelations theory.
Comparative institutionalanalysis works with internationalrelations theory to
provide an effective way to understand the interplay of institutions at the
domestic and international levels, as well at the level of international
institutionsvis-6-vis each other.
Part V offers an analysis of the efficacy of various types of antitrust
institutions to determine which of these institutions are best suited to address
the problems of internationalantitrust. This Partevaluates the capacityof each
institution to address problems that the case studies implicate. These
institutions include the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional and
bilateral trade agreements, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the International Competition Network (1CN),

t William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School.
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domestic legislatures,courts, and agencies, and the market as an institution.
Part VI concludes that existing institutions each have limitations in their
ability to address any of the issues in internationalantitrust exclusively. This
Article argues that the ICN is the institution best suited to address these issues.
This approach may assist to identify other regulatory areas in which an ICN
modeled "soft law" transnationalinstitutionalchoice may prove to be the most
effective way to address internationalissues.
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Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional

Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global
Gilded Age
D. Daniel Sokol

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview
Antitrust has entered a gilded age of increased international cooperation
and enforcement at levels never before seen. A considerable literature exists on

domestic and international institutions that make up the international antitrust
system.1 However, the conceptualization of this system needs revisiting due to
limitations in the scholarship on how best to utilize these institutions. There are
two reasons for this reconceptualization. First, in the fifteen or so years during
this most recent era of increased antitrust internationalization, institutions have
shifted in their capabilities and experiences. Second, much of the existing
scholarly literature advocates solutions across only one or two possible
institutional alternatives. What this area of law requires is comparison of all
1. See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski & Mariana Bode, Competing Ways Towards an International
Competition Policy Regime: An Economic Perspective on ICN vs. WTO, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST (Frank Columbus ed., forthcoming 2006); Sadao Nagaoka & Akira Goto, Vertical
Restraints and Market Access, 24 EMPIRICA 21 (1997); COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Michael S. Greve & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2004); Jim
Chen, The Vertical Dimension of Cooperative Competition Policy, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 1005 (2003);
KEVIN C. KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE LIMITS OF

MULTILATERALISM (2001); Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of
International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (2005); PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION
POLICY FOR THE WTO (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalAntitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 911 (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism-Races Up, Down, and
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998); Christian A. Conrad, Strategies to Reform the Regulations on
International Competition, 26 WORLD COMP. 101 (2003); Spencer Weber Waller, The
Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Michael J. Trebilcock,
Competition Policy and Trade Policy--Mediatingthe Interface, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (1996); Andre
Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in InternationalMerger Control, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 233 (2000);
Ariel Ezrachi, The Role of Voluntary Frameworks in MultinationalCooperationOver Merger Control,
36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 433 (2004); Josef Drexl, InternationalCompetition Policy After Cancn:
Placing a Singapore Issue on the WTO Development Agenda, 27 WORLD CoMP. 419 (2004); Damien J.
Neven & Lars-Hendrik Riller, The Allocation of Jurisdictionin InternationalAntitrust, 44 EUR. ECON.
REV. 845 (2000); Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competition
Debate Forward, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 481 (2001); Frank R. Schoneveld, Cartel Sanctions and
InternationalCompetition Policy: Cross-BorderCooperationand Appropriate Forumsfor Cooperation,
26 WORLD COMP. LAW & ECON. REV. 433 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, Against PrincipledAntitrust, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (2003); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000); Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 309
(2005).
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possible solutions-a comparative institutional analysis.
The application of comparative institutional analysis to international
antitrust serves a critical purpose. However, previous scholarship has not
applied comparative institutional analysis to study the effects of particular
proposals that address international antitrust. 2 Any analysis or policy
prescription that fails to examine each of the potentially relevant institutions,
both international and domestic, is incomplete. Such lack of comparative
institutional analysis has significant repercussions as to the choice of an
effective antitrust institution. In particular, assigning policy prescriptions to a
less adequate institution increases costs globally and frustrates attempts to
enhance societal welfare and lift people out of poverty.
This Article provides an in-depth study of how one area of regulatory law
responds to globalization. This response requires increased internationalization
where traditional domestic capacities seem inadequate to address
globalization's challenges. Moreover, the dynamics of internationalization in
this area suggest lessons for other areas of international regulation. Therefore,
the Article examines how various domestic and international institutions work
with each other to reduce anticompetitive conduct that has international effects.
Following such an approach provides guidance more generally on how
international organizations can improve the capacity of domestic institutions to
address difficult cross-border regulatory issues.
B. Article Roadmap
Part II provides an historical overview of international antitrust. This
overview departs from previous accounts as it focuses on participation in each
of the international antitrust institutions. Participation helps to explain the
effectiveness-or lack thereof--of a particular institutional choice.
Participation plays a critical role in framing comparative institutional analysis.
The purpose of the historical discussion is to put various international
institutions and approaches in context. This discussion also illustrates how
institutions change over time and respond to each other. The structure of these
institutions and the capacity of potential parties to participate within them
provide a framework that applies specifically to international antitrust
institutions. Part III introduces the problems of international antitrust. It
identifies and explores three case studies involving the key issues of
international antitrust: mergers, cartels, and market access.
Part IV introduces the theoretical tools to address the problems of
international antitrust. This Part makes the analytical case for the application of

2. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY
AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001).
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comparative institutional analysis to international antitrust. It addresses how a
comparative institutional analysis framework allows for a more complete
examination of both international and domestic institutions. It also explains the
participation model as the organizing principle for the analysis of institutions,
for participation affects each institution's ability to create policy remedies.
Participation in a comparative institutional analysis model depends on costs and
benefits to participation. Participation in a given institution is a function of the
costs and the benefits of participation. 3 Policy alternatives come with certain
costs, such as transaction costs. The benefits of participation include the
distribution of benefits across the affected population both on a per capita basis
and in terms of variance across the population.4
Participation frames the way to view costs and benefits of a particular
institutional choice as results of the decision making process to address societal
problems. The costs affect any given institution and the ability of actors to
participate in it. The lower the cost of participation, the more effective the
institution may be. This relationship also works in reverse. As more parties
participate, information costs decrease. This increases the benefits to parties
participating in the institution.
The second theoretical tool that Part IV introduces is international relations
theory. International relations explain the different models of organization of
international institutions. Hard law institutions favor a binding international
adjudicatory institutional choice. The soft law approach, whether
transgovernmental 5 or transnational, 6 favors an administrative agency to agency
nonbinding institutional model. Comparative institutional analysis works with
international relations theory to provide an effective way to understand the
interplay of institutions at the domestic and international levels as well at the
level of international institutions vis-A-vis each other.
Part V explores how both comparative institutional analysis and
international relations theories of international governance apply to
international antitrust institutions and affect the capacity of these international
organizations to address critical issues in international antitrust. Part V offers
an analysis of the efficacy of various types of antitrust institutions to determine
which of these institutions are best suited to address the problems of
international antitrust. This Part evaluates the capacity of each institution to
address problems that the case studies implicate and the ability of parties to
participate in each of the institutions. These institutions include the World

3. This can be understood in the equation P=flc-b), where P is institutional participation; c is the
cost of participation and b the benefit of participation.
4. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 30.
5. Agency to agency interaction is described in greater detail in Part IV.
6. Sub-state level interaction, which also includes non-state actors, is described in greater detail in
Part IV.
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Trade Organization (WTO), regional and bilateral trade agreements, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International
Competition Network (ICN), domestic courts and agencies, and the market as
institution. Earlier work has underemphasized the importance of the
participatory aspect in international antitrust institutions. From this analysis, the
importance of the ICN emerges as a soft law institution that can create antitrust
compliance more effectively than other institutional alternatives.
Part VI concludes that existing institutions each have limitations in their
ability to address any of the issues in international antitrust exclusively. This
Article argues that the ICN is the institution best suited to address these issues.
This approach may assist to identify other regulatory areas in which an ICN
modeled solution may prove to be the most effective way to address
international issues.
II.

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST HISTORY

A. EarlyAttempts at InternationalAntitrust Institutions
Increased globalization has opened markets to anticompetitive conduct by
foreign actors or exported anticompetitive practices to other countries. 7 The
internationalization of antitrust enforcement is a response to this globalization
of anticompetitive conduct. Integrated international attempts to control8
anticompetitive practices are for the most part a post-World War II endeavor.
For much of its history, coordinated international antitrust has been a history of
ineffective efforts. Institutional constraints and the lack of analytical
convergence on enforcement approaches have hampered coordinated
international antitrust efforts. The ineffectiveness of these efforts has been a
function of the type of participation in international antitrust institutions and the
costs and benefits of such participation. This Part introduces the institutional
alternatives, whereas Part V examines the costs and benefits that underlie the
potential effectiveness of each institutional alternative as the most effective
decision maker to address international antitrust issues.
The first significant multilateral attempt to remove international
anticompetitive barriers occurred at the Bretton Woods Conference of July
1944. Participants there suggested the creation of three pillars for a postwar
economic order: the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank), and the International

7. This hearkens back to earlier periods of globalization. For example, international cartels played
an important role in the pre-WWII world. WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE

POSTWAR WORLD (2002); RUDOLF K. MICHELS, CARTELS, COMBINES, AND TRUSTS IN POST-WAR
GERMANY (1928).
8. However, the League of Nations made an initial foray into this area. Wailer, supranote 1, at 349.
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Trade Organization (ITO). In particular, the ITO charter provided for increased
trade liberalization. It included a section on restrictive business practices. The
ITO would have allowed for dispute resolution for violations of anticompetitive
conduct. Specifically, members were to take measures against "business
practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access
to markets, or foster monopolistic control whenever such practices have
harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade." 9 The ITO would have
been empowered to investigate such conduct and recommend remedial action
to member governments. 10 The ITO also previewed many of the issues
discussed in the current international antitrust circles-public and private
restraints, cartels, monopolization, and market access.
However, the ITO faced resistance from a number of countries, including
the United States. The U.S. Congress feared a loss of sovereignty and the
limitations that the charter might impose upon U.S. businesses. Developing
countries also felt that the costs of participation outweighed the benefits,
because of these countries' increased focus on an import substitution industrial
policy. " The differences in conceptualization of economic policy and
government control in the economy precluded consensus
on the ITO. Without
12
U.S. support, the organization did not materialize.
During the early postwar period, the U.S. Department of Justice undertook
successful aggressive criminal prosecution of many of the international cartels
that had been active in the interwar period.' 3 This was a push specific to the
international cartel as a business model. 14 As a result of the ineffectiveness of
international efforts to create the ITO, the United States took a unilateral
approach to international cartels through the application of its antitrust laws
extraterritorially. 15Starting in 1945 with the United States v. Aluminum
9. 62 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3206, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION: INCLUDING A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF THE CHARTER, Art. 46 (1948).
10. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 592

(3d ed. 2005).
11. WELLS,supra note 7, at43-137.
12. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). GATT members later

adopted a limited Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices in
1960, BISD 9S/ 28-29, that had little effect.
13. WELLS, supra note 9, at 43-137.
14. Helen Mercer, The Rhetoric and Reality of Anti-cartel Policies: Britain, Germany and Japan
and the Effects of US Pressure in the 1940s, in CARTELS AND MARKET MANAGEMENT IN THE POSTWAR WORLD (LSE Business History Occasional Paper, No. 1,London School of Economics, Carlo

Morelli ed., 1997).
15. Because of the economic and political weakness of postwar Europe, the United States did not
press European countries on their toleration and sometimes active support of cartels. The EU did not
take an active role in cartel enforcement until the 1990s. This had to do with greater tolerance of cartels
in some countries as a way to better organize their export activity or a different sense of what was
critical in promoting "competition" within the nascent European community. Generally, the EU avoided
areas of disagreement in enforcement of competition law where there was the possibility of political
resistance from Member States. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 358 (1998).
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Company of America, 16 the United States began to apply its antitrust laws
extraterritorially against anticompetitive conduct.17 Extraterritorial applications
of domestic antitrust laws provide an alternative "self-help" approach to
international spillover concerns.18
Extraterritoriality exemplifies the costs that limited participation creates
vis-A-vis benefits. Other countries do not appreciate extraterritorial reach into
their domestic antitrust systems, especially when they do not have a similar
belief as to what constitutes anticompetitive harm. The use of extraterritoriality
for self-help does not allow for any input from other countries. This reduces
these countries' participation in prosecutorial decision making. Such countries
may respond by creating roadblocks to effective extraterritorial action by the
intervening nation's antitrust agency.
Sovereignty concerns limit the potential benefits of extraterritoriality.
Extraterritoriality meant that, to a certain extent, the United States became the
antitrust enforcer of the world. At the time of early U.S. extraterritorial
enforcement, many countries did not view cartels as a particularly serious
problem relative to their perceived benefits of helping to strengthen domestic
economies at the expense of foreign consumers. The most famous case of
opposition to U.S. antitrust action abroad was the U.S. effort to break up the
international uranium cartel. As a consequence of U.S. action against the cartel,
European countries and Canada enacted blocking statutes to limit cooperation
with the United States on the litigation.' 9 It was not until the late 1980s that the
EU recognized extraterritoriality in its own antitrust system. Similarly, not
until 1969
did the EC successfully prosecute its first case against a secret
cartel. 21
B. Modern InternationalAntitrust Institutions

Even as the United States undertook unilateral efforts, attempts to create
16. 148 F.2d416 (2dCir. 1945).
17. Focusing on extraterritorial application may still create gaps in enforcement. See F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004), where the U.S. Supreme Court limited the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. The Court held that foreign purchasers that claimed injury
from international price fixing could not sue in U.S. courts absent allegations that an injury to U.S.
consumers facilitated the harm to the foreign purchasers.
18. Trebilcock and Howse would apply extraterritoriality so as to create a cause of action for any
violation that harms a country's consumers for imports. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 10, at 602.
19. Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy-Today and Tomorrow, 2 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 403 (1999).
20. See the cases jointly referred to as the Wood Pulp cartel cases, Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116,
117 & 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, established the effects
test. For a more detailed explanation of antitrust extraterritoriality, see Edward T. Swaine, The Local
Law of GlobalAntitrust,43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627, 641-46 (2001).
21. Mario Monti, Address at the EMAC in Brussels, Belgium: The Fight Against Cartels (Sept. 11,
2002). EC efforts against global cartels occurred in earnest after 1995. See John M. Connor, Private
International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement 30-31 (Purdue Univ., Staff
Paper No. 03-12, Nov. 5, 2003).
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global institutions did not end with the ITO. The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) first addressed antitrust issues in 1961,
when it formed the Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLPC). The
CLPC's purpose was to serve as a talking shop for OECD member agencies, to
22
collect and discuss information on antitrust, and to promote harmonization.
During the 1990s the OECD expanded its discussions specifically to the
created the Joint
international trade and antitrust interface. In 1996, the OECD
23
Group on Trade and Competition to discuss this interface.
Participation in the OECD is a function of its membership. Its members are
antitrust regulators from OECD member and observer countries. The OECD
accommodates participation by member countries with similar economic
development and antitrust systems. It is essentially a club of developed
countries, which set the antitrust agenda of the organization. The CLPC
provides a forum for OECD members to come to understandings on
international antitrust issues.
Over the years, the OECD has promulgated a number of nonbinding
recommendations to improve antitrust coordination and foster harmonizationin 1967, 1973, 1979, 1986, 1995, 1998, and 2005.24 These recommendations
include increased cooperation and coordination among agencies, as well as
specific recommendations regarding cartels and mergers. In a number of cases,
these recommendations have served as the template for best practices across
OECD member nations. However, these recommendations have not created
significant compliance among OECD members. The nonbinding nature of the
recommendations based on the OECD's institutional capacity did not create an
incentive for countries to undertake their implementation, as the discussion in
Part V lays out in greater detail. 25 As to global adoption of OECD
recommendations, the power dynamics of the OECD, in which there is no
meaningful developing world participation in shaping the agenda or norms,

22 . A lack of a belief in markets hobbled early OECD efforts to impose voluntary
recommendations on anticompetitive conduct. During the 1970s, when the United States experienced its
antitrust revolution, it was a solitary voice at OECD meetings that sought to use antitrust to create more
efficient markets. John H. Shenefield, Coherence or Confusion: The Future of the Global Antitrust
Conversation,49 ANTITRUST BULL. 385, 392 (2004).

23. It did so after the WTO created a similar group for possible inclusion of antitrust in the current
trade negotiation agenda.
24. OECD, Recommendation of the Council of 5 October 1967 [c (567) 53 (Final)]; OECD,
Recommendation of the Council of 3 July 1973 [C (73) 99 (Final)]; OECD, Recommendation of the
Council of 25 September 1979 [C (79) 154 (Final)]; OECD, Recommendation of the Council of 21May
of 1986[C (86) 44 (Final)]; OECD, Recommendation of the Council of 27 and 28 July 1995 [C (95) 130
(Final)]; OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core
Cartels, 25 March 1998 [C(98)35/FINAL; OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review,
23 March 2005 - C(2005)34; OECD, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE FORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN HARD CORE CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS (2005).

25. The most recent iteration of progress on implementation based on case studies can be found at
OECD, Hard Core Cartels-ThirdReport on the Implementation of the 1998 OECD Recommendation,
8 OECD J. COMP. L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (2006).
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contribute to the lack of adoption.
Unlike the OECD, where membership is open only to developed countries,
membership in the UNCTAD is open to all UN members. The UNCTAD
undertook a role in antitrust beginning in the 1970s. It was during this period
that UNCTAD members began negotiations on a restrictive business practices
code. The code negotiations allowed for developing-world countries, the vast
majority of which lacked their own antitrust regimes at the time, to create an
alternative approach to that of the OECD. The developing world's vision for
the UNCTAD code was twofold. On the one hand, the code was to limit the
ability of multinational corporations (MNCs) to operate in their countries. On
the other hand, the code was to condone developing-world anticompetitive
practices.26
In 1980, the UNCTAD adopted the nonbinding code. 27 Ultimately, the
UNCTAD code was a compromise of the developing world with the United
States and European countries rather than the original vision of developingworld countries. This compromise led to vagueness in many of the code
provisions. The code focused on domestic implementation of antitrust law
rather than on increased coordination across countries. It placated developingworld interests, but, because of U.S. hostility, it did not frame the debate on
international antitrust or antitrust generally. Given that most countries of the
world lacked any antitrust agency at that time, the code may
have been largely
28
aspirational. For many countries, it had little lasting effect.
The code's impact was a product of participation in the UNCTAD process.
Part V explores more generally the costs and benefits of UNCTAD
participation and their implications on its effectiveness as an institution. As to
how participation explains the adoption and the provisions of the code,
participation within UNCTAD consists largely of country delegates to
UNCTAD meetings. Developing countries' interests have a more powerful
voice in the UNCTAD than in other international antitrust organizations. This
allowed many countries that lacked antitrust laws, market-based economies,
and competition cultures to play an important role in shaping the debate in
creating the code. U.S. participation in this process was diluted because of its
less hegemonic role. The United States could limit the excesses of some of the
26. Shenefield, supra note 22, at 391.
27. UNCTAD, Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Anticompetitive Practices,TD/RBP/CONF/10iREV. 1 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1980).
28. The William Baxter-led Reagan antitrust team, who came to office shortly after the code's
adoption, viewed the code with mistrust and sought to limit its impact. Some scholars believe that the
impact of the code was more far reaching. They argue the impact of the code was to help push for the
creation of antitrust laws and agencies in a number of countries. Douglas E. Rosenthal & Phedon
Nicolaides, Harmonizing Antitrust: The Less Effective Way to Promote InternationalCompetition, in

GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 355, 370 (Edward M. Graham & David J. Richardson eds., 1997). Yet, it
was not until the 1990s that such antitrust laws became common as part of a general shift of macro- and
micro-economic liberalization in developing-world and transitional countries.
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proposals but could not shape the UNCTAD's agenda (as it could in other
international antitrust organizations).
C. The ContemporaryDebate
For the next decade, outside of continuing OECD meetings, countries
undertook few significant international antitrust efforts within an international
institutional context. This changed when Lord Brittan, then the head of antitrust
for the EU, articulated a contemporary vision for international antitrust in his
1992 speech at the World Competition Forum. 29 He suggested a three-part
focus. First, a purely domestic focus on antitrust policy could not address
aspects of international anticompetitive conduct. Second, the nonbinding nature
of current international agreements was ineffective. Third, the lack of any
antitrust law in a number of jurisdictions added to the international problem.
The linkage Brittan made between trade and antitrust was that with increased
trade liberalization, private firms could erect barriers to entry in the place of the
dismantled government barriers, harming societal welfare.
Others contributed to this modem conception of an international
institutional response to antitrust issues. A number of scholars prepared a
systemic attempt at international antitrust called the Munich Draft Code. These
experts suggested plurilateral agreement to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). 30 The experts behind the Draft Code believed that the Draft
Code and GATT could provide the basis for an international agenda for
discussion and potential agreement. 31 A report by a group of experts to the
EU's antitrust regulators suggested an approach similar to the Draft Code's.
The experts proposed internationally binding minimum standards that would be
incorporated into domestic antitrust laws. 32 However, because the experts did
not represent countries' antitrust agencies, they did not account for the political
economy realities that shape agency- and country-level acceptance of
proposals, as agency participation in developing the work product would have.
These efforts created momentum for discussions of new institutional
approaches to address international antitrust issues. The Singapore Ministerial
Declaration of 1996 created a new WTO mandate to study antitrust and its
interaction with trade policy. The declaration articulated a desire to "establish a

29. Lord Brittan, Address at the World Competition Forum in Davos, Switzerland: A Framework
for International Competition (Feb. 3, 1992).
30. Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-WTO Plurilateral Agreement (Int'l Antitrust
Code Working Group Proposed Draft 1993), published & released July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.).
31.

David J. Gerber, The U.S.-European Conflict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal

Experience Perspective,24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 123, 127-28 (2002).
32. European Commission, Directorate-General IV, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order:
Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules: Report of the Group of Experts, COM(95)0359-C40352/95 (July 3, 1995).
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working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the interaction
between trade and competition policy, including anticompetitive practices, in
order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO
framework., 33 Participation in the Working Group on the Interaction Between
Trade and Competition Policy was open to WTO member countries.
Participation dynamics were different than in the UNCTAD setting of the late
1970s because of the relative power of the developed world (particularly the
United States and EU) in the WTO and because more countries of the
developing world had adopted economic liberalization, including creation or
planned creation of their own antitrust regimes.
Once underway, the scope of the Working Group grew. In 1997, its initial
report set out the major issues for discussion. 34 This agenda included most if
not all of the major issues that linked antitrust to international trade and
development. Because of the breadth of this agenda, many contentious issues in
the antitrust and trade interface made the list. Decisions on how to address or
not address these issues helped narrow the scope of what the Working Group,
which met from 1997 to 2003, discussed.
In 1998, the Working Group began discussing issues on the checklist. 35 One
concern was how market access issues could distort antitrust objectives.36
Differing opinions as to the appropriate role of market access, as it related to
antitrust, remained significant. Countries could not break the impasse with
revised proposals. 37 Consequently, over the course of Working Group
deliberations, the focus of proposals shifted from market access to politically
38
less difficult issues.
The WTO articulated the Working Group's new focus on "core" principles
in the 2001 Doha Declaration. These core principles included transparency,
nondiscrimination, procedural fairness, voluntary cooperation, capacity
building, and discipline of hard-core cartels. 39 Among substantive antitrust
provisions, cartel enforcement seemed to be the one area in which countries

33. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC
[hereinafter Singapore Declaration].
34. Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, DraftReport (1997)
to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/W/49 (Nov. 25 1997).
35. Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General
Council, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998).

36. Philip Marsden, The Impropriety of WTO "'MarketAccess" Rules on Vertical Restraints, 21
WORLD COMP. 5 (1998); WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Annual Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy

to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/5 (Oct. 8, 2001).
37. PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO ch. IV (2003).

38. Robert Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral
Trading System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 531 (2002).
39. World
Trade
Organization,
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
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might agree on a definition and set of approaches. However, even with a
proposed reduction in scope at the WTO, there remained significant divergence
in views, preventing advanced negotiations on binding antitrust WTO rules.4 °
By 2003, the Working Group agreed that any binding standards for antitrust
law were not feasible or desirable. In 2003, at its Cancun Ministerial, the WTO
ended the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition
Policy and dropped antitrust from the trade agenda. Similarly, by 2006, the
OECD, in response to U.S. concerns, had dropped the Joint Group on Trade
and Competition.
To shift the focus of the Working Group, the United States undertook a
domestic review of how to frame the internationalization of antitrust law and
reshape the international debate. The U.S. International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee (ICPAC) studied international antitrust issues, held
hearings, and in 2000 issued a report outlining an alternative approach to the
WTO on international trade and antitrust. ICPAC promoted soft law
harmonization to address the "entire global competition agenda.", 4 1 It also
opposed any dispute resolution at the WTO. 42 To promote soft law
harmonization, ICPAC proposed a Global Competition Initiative as a forum for
the discussion antitrust issues.43
This vision of the Global Competition Initiative actualized in the ICN,
which agencies from twelve countries founded in 2001.44 Soon, all antitrust
agencies joined the ICN. The critical components of ICN participation are that
all antitrust agencies are members and that active stakeholder participation
augments agencies' participation. In the ICN, all the world's antitrust agencies
and stakeholders discuss policy issues and work to implement best practices.
This provides the potential for increased developing-world involvement, as Part
V details. Agencies, bar associations, consumer groups, and the business

40. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J.Evenett, A Multilateral Frameworkfor Competition Policy?, in
THE SINGAPORE ISSUES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE ROAD TO CANCUN AND BEYOND 77

(State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Switzerland) & Simon J. Evenett eds., 2003).
41. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report to the Attorney General
and Assistant Attorney
General for
Antitrust, at
281
(2000),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm [hereinafter ICPAC Report].
42. Id.at 286.
43. One of the most thorough and thoughtful conceptualizations and one that had implications on
the future of the trade and competition interface came from Eleanor Fox. The Fox proposal foresaw
some of the developments of the ICN, and some of Fox's suggestions were incorporated (though with
even less specifics) into the ICPAC Report. See ICPAC Report at 281-84. Fox's proposal included items
that were more conceptual and harder to galvanize agreement. She proposed a World Competition
Forum that addressed a number of substantive issues. However, her agenda did not account for
bargaining power constraints across countries and which parties' interests set the antitrust agenda.
Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J.INT'L ECON. L. 665, 675-77 (1999)
[hereinafter Millennium Round].
44. The founding members of the ICN were Australia, Canada, the European Union, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Zambia. See the discussion on the ICN in Part V infra for more detail.
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community generally have been receptive to the agenda and work product of
the ICN. This is due to their participation in ICN discussions and outputs.
Throughout the history of international antitrust, the participatory approach
suggests that exit and voice play critical roles in international organizations.4 5 If
powerful countries dislike the lack of consensus or the state of debate in an
organization, they can exit and move discussions to another pre-existing or new
organization. The United States was unhappy with the WTO as an institutional
choice for international antitrust. It therefore created the ICN as an institutional
home for the U.S.-framed antitrust agenda. As the EU saw that consensus was
not possible in the WTO, it too moved its efforts to the ICN on those issues
where consensus could be reached.
Alternatively, countries and antitrust agencies can exercise voice to change
an organization. This too has been the history of international antitrust. The
United States in particular has used voice to shape its participation in
international organizations. The U.S. voice has persuaded organizations to
adopt a view of antitrust that accepts at some basic level the tenets of the
Chicago School antitrust revolution, which are based on price, quantity and
quality. The general lesson from this history is that each institutional structure
suffers from problems of participation and power dynamics. However, each
institution responds differently to these problems. Moreover, the historical
analysis suggests that the United States cannot go it alone to create systemwide change to address international antitrust problems. Rather, substantial
change only seems to occur if the United States can obtain buy-in from others
(particularly the EU). Additionally, if existing institutions seem to be unable to
create effective solutions, new institutions can be created that can better
overcome the weaknesses of existing institutional alternatives.
The ability of each of these modern and contemporary institutions to
address issues in international antitrust remains a work in progress. Part IV of
this Article explains in greater detail how participation shapes the analysis of
these institutions. Utilizing comparative institutional analysis, Part V examines
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these institutions. To the extent that an
institution improves the quality of enforcement at a manageable cost, that
institution may be the appropriate means to address international antitrust
issues generally.
III.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT ANTITRUST

As an explanatory device, this Article employs three case studies. Case
studies provide examples for more general normative conclusions regarding
45. For the general conceptualization of voice and exit see the seminal ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). In the international legal context see Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow
of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GA 7T/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339,
349 (2002).
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appropriate international antitrust institutions. These conclusions may allow

antitrust to achieve optimal results to improve the lives of consumers around
the world through the choice of the most effective institution.46 The issues
raised by the case studies are ones familiar to current antitrust institutions and
debates surrounding international antitrust. The case studies reveal different
aspects of the antitrust spectrum. The case study of hard-core cartels illustrates
the challenges of addressing behavior that is presumptively illegal. The case
study of mergers examines behavior that is presumptively legal. Both of these
are case studies in which the primary problem is one of coordination costs
across jurisdictions. The third case study, of market access, highlights the
difficulty in addressing exclusionary behavior whose effects may or may not be
anticompetitive and where the primary problem is substantive disagreement
rather than procedural coordination.
Greater harmonization of merger and cartel enforcement has been the focus
of many antitrust agencies and the private antitrust bar for some time. These
issues have been critical in discussions within the ICN and the OECD CLPC.
Market access has been a focus in WTO antitrust discussions and in discussions
held by the UNCTAD and the OECD Joint Group. Though the discussions
have shifted to less contentious topics within the antitrust and international
trade interface, market access issues remain one of the core difficulties that
arise in this interface. The ability of antitrust institutions to address issues that
interface with other areas of law has become increasingly relevant in a
globalized world economy. Shortcomings of antitrust in addressing the effects
of trade distortions threaten to limit the potential gains of trade liberalization.
A. Cartels
1. Harms
Hard-core cartels involve agreements among competitors to fix prices,
allocate customers or markets, and restrict output.47 There is a presumption that
hard-core cartel activities are illegal. Indeed, a recent U.S. Supreme Court
opinion states that cartels are "the supreme evil of antitrust. ''4s Scholars have
46. On the rationale for the case study method, see John Gerring, What Is a Case Study and What Is
It Good For?, 98 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 341 (2004). An application of comparative institutional analysis to

other specific issues within international antitrust may yield a different set of institutional choices. This
remains an area for further research.
47. Michael K. Vaska, Conscious ParallelismandPrice Fixing: Defining the Boundary, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 508, 511 (1985).

48. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
The U.S. system and increasingly the rest of the world now view cartels this way. On the other hand,
similar type of monopoly power by single firm conduct tends to be viewed through a less harsh lens
because of possible efficiencies that unilateral conduct may provide. See Peter C. Carstensen, False
Positives in Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual Error, Business Reality and
Aspen (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Berkeley Business Law Journal).
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documented the economic harm of international cartels in a number of recent
works. 49 These cartels have had a negative spillover effect in many
jurisdictions.
The extent of the international cartel problem remains a mystery, as private
international cartels operate in secret. Estimates as to the number and impact of
international cartels vary. According to the OECD, antitrust enforcers detect
and prosecute as few as one in six cartels. 50 Academic work suggests agencies
51
identify and successfully prosecute between ten and thirty percent of cartels.
Since U.S. enforcers, the most experienced in cartel investigations, continue to
find cartels operating in the United States, even with a combination of civil
(including treble damages) and criminal penalties for cartel activity, it seems
likely that international cartels remain significant in every jurisdiction.
Cartels affect both developed and developing-world economies. 52 The total
damage by cartels may be significant. In developing countries, scholars
estimate that in 1997 alone, the value of known cartel effects by international
cartels was $51.1 billion (and undetected cartel damage was not computed). To
put this figure in perspective, these cartel overcharges surpass the amount of all
foreign aid to developing countries that year-$39.4 billion. " Cartel
overcharges in 1997 reflected anticompetitive conduct that affected 4.7 percent
of developing-world imports and 0.9 percent of developing-world Gross
Domestic Product. Overcharges by cartels to developed countries are even
larger. International hard-core cartels created a consumer welfare loss of $140.8
billion in high-income countries in 1997. 54
The percentage overcharges that cartels impose are also significant. A
recent study on U.S. cartels shows a median and average cartel overcharge
between fifteen and thirty-six percent. Most of these overcharges fell within the

49.

See, e.g., SIMON EVENETr, VALERIE SUSLOW & MARGARET LEVENSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL

CARTELS IN GLOBAL MARKETS (2006); Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow & Lynda Oswald,
International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy

Remedies (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9511, 2003); Frrdric Jenny, Cartels
and Collusion in Developing Countries: Lessons from Empirical Evidence, 29 WORLD COMP. 109
(2006).
50. OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: RECENT PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 28 (2003).

51. It may be that cartels that are detected and prosecuted are different from cartels that remain
hidden and may be more durable in duration. However, discovered cartels may be the function of the
proclivity of company management to serve as whistleblowers for a cartel. See Connor, supranote 21, at
12.
52. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, Tackling InternationalAnticompetitive Practicesin the
Americas: Implications for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, in INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS:

FTAA AND BEYOND 345 (Antoni Estevadeordal, Dani Rodrik, Alan M. Taylor & Andrds Velasco eds.,
2004).
53. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and
Developing Countries Economic Effects and Implicationsfor Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
801 (2004).

54. Id.
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twenty to thirty percent range. 55 These overcharges are particularly striking
given that, since the mid-i 990s, hard-core cartel prosecution has been a priority
of both U.S. and EU antitrust enforcers. The current fight against hard-core
cartels enjoys broad international support and differs from historic attempts to
combat them, in which some major jurisdictions opted not to take action
against cartels,
2. Cartels and Their Implicationsfor Law and Development

Cartels play an important role in law and development. Overcharges allow
for the misallocation of resources from more productive uses. This has a
particularly important impact for developing-world countries. Where countries
have fewer resources, the misallocation of these resources may limit
opportunities for economic growth. Inputs for various products or services may
be higher as a result of international cartels. This may lead to an increased cost
of production in a country, making it less competitive for foreign direct
investment (FDI) from other countries.
Recent scholarship regarding cartels suggests an urgent need to combat
cartels with appropriate institutions and remedies.56 The developing world has
limited capacity to protect its consumers from overcharges by international
cartels. Of countries that lack antitrust agencies, nearly all are in the developing
world. The lack of antitrust law and an antitrust agency seems to invite
international hard-core cartel conduct. For example, in the international vitamin
cartel, countries that lacked antitrust agencies had higher overcharges than
those that had agencies. 57 Further, cartels can take advantage of weak antitrust
agencies without the resources necessary to address international cartels.
Even when another antitrust agency (usually that of the United States, the
EU, or an EU member state) uncovers an international cartel that also affects a
developing country, this does not necessarily remedy the international damage
that such a cartel may cause there. Often developing-world antitrust agencies
fail to respond even to uncovered international hard-core cartels. 58 There are
capacity constraints to developing-world cartel enforcement. Many developingworld agencies do not have the expertise or resources to combat hard-core
cartels. Domestic agencies may be unable to prosecute cartels because they lack

55. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implicationsfor
Reform of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513 (2006).
56. ICN WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, DEFINING HARD CORE CARTEL CONDUCT: EFFECTIVE
INSTITUTIONS, EFFECTIVE PENALTIES (Building Blocks for Effective Anti-Cartel Regimes Vol. 1, 2005),
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference4th-bonni2005/Effective_A
nti-Cartel RegimesBuildingBlocks.pdf.
57. Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws:
Evidencefrom the InternationalVitamins Cartel,48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 692 (2003).

58. Levenstein & Suslow, supranote 53, at 803.
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domestic evidence and the means to obtain evidence abroad. 59 When
developing agencies decide to take on international cartels, it may take them
time to develop the capabilities to attack the cartels effectively. For example,
though the Korean Free Trade Commission was set up in 1980, it took until
2002 for the agency to fine an international cartel. 60 Similarly, Brazil's
anticartel efforts languished until 2002, even though Brazil enacted its most
recent antitrust law in 1994 and a previous antitrust law had existed since
1962.61
3. Domestic Institution Capacity ConstraintsAgainst Cartels
Even with domestic limitations, domestic cartel enforcement shows
increased effectiveness in terms of the ability of agencies to enforce their laws
against hard-core cartels. Within recent years, a number of countries have
begun to catch up with more advanced antitrust regimes. 62 Nevertheless,
significant gaps remain in enforcement.
There are two types of concerns regarding the capacity of domestic antitrust
regimes. First, there are those regimes with no underlying competition culture.
In such regimes, the public has not been educated as to cartel harms. In these
situations, where there is an antitrust agency but no competition culture, cartels
may operate transparently and still go unpunished. In such settings, consumers
may not understand that cartels cause them significant economic losses.63
In other cases, antitrust authorities have established a competition culture in
which the public understands the economic harms of cartels. This presents a
different set of enforcement challenges. A competition culture pushes cartel
behavior underground. When cartels operate in secret, this increases the costs
of detection. When these cartels are international cartels, cartel members have
better coordination than do enforcers across jurisdictions. Cartels can hide
documents and meetings in other jurisdictions, which makes getting evidence
64
and witnesses more difficult.
Combating international cartels requires coordination among agencies
across countries. In some cases, legal or operational impediments may limit
information sharing between agencies. Moreover, detection can prove difficult
when necessary information is scattered across jurisdictions. Addressing
international cartels places increased capacity constraints on agencies by
59.

(2003).
60.
61.
July 12,
62.
63.

Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalAntitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911, 917

Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 53, at 843.
Geraldo Samor, Trustbusters Take Aim in Brazil-Illegal Cartels Feel the Heat, WALL ST. J.,
2005, at A15.
OECD, supra note 25, at 9.
Mark Tilton, The Difference Government Policy Makes: The Case of Japan, in HOW CARTELS

ENDURE AND How THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 191 (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004).
64. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 66-69 (2001).
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raising the cost of effective enforcement. It also involves domestic and
international political concerns with respect to cooperating with other agencies,
sharing information (including confidential information), and, potentially,
extraditing nationals for trial and incarceration in other jurisdictions. Not all
countries have criminal penalties for cartel-related conduct. Moreover, there are
additional coordination problems, as agencies need to coordinate predawn
raids, searches, and interviews across multiple jurisdictions.
For these reasons, part of effective enforcement against cartels is the
creation of effective domestic institutions. An additional element to increased
enforcement is the creation of effective penalties. 65 The threat of treble
damages, for example, may deter potential cartel members in the United
States.66 This chilling effect occurs even though settlements in cartel cases tend
to be closer to single damages than treble damages. 67 Nevertheless, at present
companies seem to be under-deterred globally to put an end to hard-core cartel
behavior.
Another way to strengthen enforcement penalties is to increase nonfinancial
penalties. This means meting out criminal sentences to executives who
participate in cartels. There is some evidence that criminal penalties deter cartel
membership. 68 Among ICN members surveyed, forty-two percent of existing
anticartel laws allow for jail time. 69 However, even where there are criminal
sentences, there is not always cooperation across jurisdictions in enforcing
them. Some jurisdictions are less willing to cooperate with enforcement that
entails foreign incarceration of their citizens.
Sometimes a cartel's anticompetitive behavior has no domestic effects. This
may encourage exporting countries to pursue policies that create domestic
benefits but negative externalities.70 This is particularly true in the case of nonsecret cartels. The international diamond cartel, for example, had no U.S.
operations for years. Overcharge profits to the cartel leader, South African
company de Beers, may have had positive spillover effects on the South
African economy. Similarly, OPEC member countries may reap benefits from
their cartel's setting a price that yields a higher than competitive rate of return
where the price exceeds marginal cost for petroleum. Insulation from
extraterritorial effect may check domestic agencies' motivation to fight
international cartel behavior that helps their own countries but increases overall
65. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implicationsfor
Optimal CartelFines, 80 TUL. L. REv. 513 (2005).
66. Harry First, Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutionsand the Coming of InternationalCompetition

Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001).
67. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
115 (1993).
68. OECD, supranote 25, at 27; ICN, supra note 56, at 74.
69. ICN, supra note 56, at 3.
70. Joseph F. Francois & Henrik Horn, Antitrust in Open Economies (Tinbergen Inst., Discussion
Paper No. 2006-006/2).
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global costs.
4. Cooperation Costs
Cooperation among antitrust enforcers may improve cartel enforcement.71
Cooperation on hard-core cartels reduces enforcement costs where the cartel
affects many countries but no one agency can remedy this on its own. When
countries investigate the same behavior, information sharing reduces costs of
an investigation. Information sharing across agencies has increased over time.
Indeed, in the United States it has become routine.72 However, agencies do not
share as much confidential and nonconfidential information as they need to for
effective international cartel enforcement. Laws bar many antitrust agencies
from sharing information gained during a cartel investigation, even if the
information is not confidential.73 In other cases, agencies may be reluctant to
share confidential information because they do not trust that their sister agency
will keep it confidential.
Parallel investigations into the same case across jurisdictions present some
problems for cooperation. Generally, agencies are unlikely to share information
about a cartel member unless it participates in leniency programs in more than
one country. 74 Leniency entails immunity from or reductions in legal sanctions,
compared to what prosecutors might seek in the absence of full and voluntary
cooperation. 75 On the one hand, the introduction of a leniency program may
help to limit the viability of international cartels. On the other hand, discussions
as to which firm to offer leniency (especially if different firms come forward
for leniency across jurisdictions) may affect the ability to get information and
cooperation from parallel investigations around the world and may increase
coordination costs.
Some solutions to cartel enforcement may be primarily domestic. This Part
makes clear the limitations of purely domestic institutions and responses. In
some countries, there may be no criminal penalties for cartel behavior. In other
countries, there may be no multiplier for cartel penalties. Prosecuting cartels6
7
may be insufficient deterrent because the penalties imposed are too low.
71. BRUNO ZANETTIN, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AGENCIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL
LEVEL (2002).

72. R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust in a Transatlantic
Context-From the Cicada's Perspective, Address Before the Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context
Conference
(June
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.useu.be/Categories/Antitrust/June0704PateSpeech.html.
73. OECD, supranote 25, at 7.
74. Clarke & Evenett, supra note 40.
75. ICN, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT MANUAL ch. 2 (2005).
76. OECD, supra note 25, at 25. John Connor suggests that most cartel members in a global cartel
may have a reasonable expectation that if they are caught, the financial penalties for their cartel
participation will be significantly below their expected profits. Connor argues that to chill cartel
behavior, the sanction against cartel members should be increased to approximately four times the
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Improved ability to fight international hard-core cartels requires more
cooperation and information sharing, increased coordination on leniency,
improved domestic capacity to try cases, improved investigative techniques,
and effective penalty regimes. Domestic institutions alone seem limited in their
ability to take on these tasks, particularly the operational issues of international
coordination. A review of international institutional options in Part V provides
institutional alternatives to improve the global capacity to fight hard-core
cartels.
B. Mergers
1. Costs to the Current System
Mergers and acquisitions play an important role in the global economy. In
2005, global mergers and acquisitions totaled $2.9 trillion. 77 This activity
serves as a driver in the global economy. Additionally, mergers serve as a
mechanism for increased FDI into countries. 78 Empirical work suggests that
mergers may be the primary vehicle for FDI flows worldwide. 79 Just as mergers
have increased, so has the regulation of mergers. More countries have
introduced merger control systems. At present, over sixty countries have some
sort of merger law in place. 80 The reach of international merger regulation and
high coordination costs therefore has important effects for both developed and
developing countries.
The purpose of merger control is to protect consumers from merging firms
acquiring and exercising market power. Though there are benefits to merger
control, it also creates costs. Substantive costs occur when agencies make Type
I or II enforcement errors. In Type I errors, agencies attempt to block a merger
that will have procompetitive effects. Type II errors occur when agencies fail to
expected global cartel profits. To ensure the deterrence of cartel members, penalties in each of the
geographic regions of the cartel's operation should be equal to eight times global cartel overcharges.
John M. Connor, Optimal Deterrence and PrivateInternationalCartels (Purdue Univ. Dep't of Agric.
Econ., Working Paper, 2005), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=787927. Robert Lande is also critical
of the under-deterrence of cartel fines. See Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be
Raised, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329 (2004). For a view that suggests that fines have been too large,
see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Enforcement of the Antirust Laws Against Corporations,69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715 (2001).
77.
Stephen Taub, M&A Activity Highest since Dotcom Days, CFO.com, Dec. 28, 2005,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5350017?f=related.
78. Volker Nocke & Stephen Yeaple, Cross-BorderMergers and Acquisitions Versus Greenfield
Foreign DirectInvestment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneiy,J. INT'L ECON. (forthcoming 2007).
79. OECD, NEW PATrERNS OF INDUSTRIAL GLOBALISATION: CROSS-BORDER M&AS AND
ALLIANCES (2001); Nam-Hoon Kang & Sara Johansson, Cross-borderMergers and Acquisitions: Their
Role in IndustrialGlobalisation(STI Working Papers, 2000/1).
80.
William J. Kolasky, Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for
Antitrust Agencies-New and Old, Remarks Before the International Bar Association Conference on
Competition Law and Policy in a Global Context, Cape Town, South Africa (Mar. 18, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.pdf.
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block anticompetitive mergers. These errors can affect economic efficiency,
growth, and development.
Most mergers do not create serious competitive risks. Roughly two thirds of
reportable mergers in the United States receive "early termination." 8' In the
remainder of cases, agencies investigate the mergers for competitive effects. Of
the total number of investigations, agencies undertake more advanced
investigations of only twenty percent of them. 82 Government enforcers
challenge a much smaller number. In 2003 for example, the DOJ and FTC
challenged only fifteen merger transactions out of 1,014 total notified
transactions. Similarly, in the EU, over ninety percent of notified cases receive
no intervention by EU authorities after the initial investigation. 83 These figures
are a bit misleading, since both jurisdictions have filing thresholds based on the
size of the companies and size of the transaction. Thus, many unreported
mergers occur in both jurisdictions because they are presumptively
procompetitive.
Even with a merger regime that limits Type I and Type II errors, the merger
control process remains costly. Merger control creates transaction costs, delay,
and uncertainty for international business. 84 There are two dimensions to
merger transactional costs. First, there are the operational costs of a merger in
any one jurisdiction and across multiple jurisdictions. Second, managing
divergent requirements in different jurisdictions is another type of transaction
cost based on the cost of coordination across jurisdictions. Any merger across
multiple jurisdictions presents potential substantive costs in evaluation. There
may be very different ways of viewing the potential effects of a merger across
jurisdictions. In measuring the possible economic harm of a potential merger,
the standards to use, factors to review, and economic tests to apply vary across
jurisdictions. Not only the evaluation of the proposed merger, but also the
evaluation of the ways to evaluate it, can represent significant transaction costs.
The costs of a given merger or acquisition are both direct and indirect. Both
sets of costs may be significant. Direct costs of merger regulation include the
fees for legal services and filing fees. Indirect costs are more difficult to
quantify monetarily. They include the companies' time spent working on a
merger and the corresponding productivity loss. Delays in approving a merger
may cause companies to forego the efficiencies that merger would have created
or lose key staff uncomfortable with the uncertainty. A long delay may imperil
the deal itself: companies may decide to scuttle their proposed merger as the
delay drags on.
81.
(Global
82.
83.

Howrey & Simon, Trends in US Government Antitrust Enforcement, ANTITRUST REV. AM. 48
Competition Review Special Issue, 2005).
Id.at 49.
Id.at51.

84. F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994).
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Merger costs may also impose costs equivalent to a tax on various
international deals. A recent study finds that the average external cost per
merger transaction was 63.28 million (with a median cost of £821,000), plus an
external filing cost of £540,000. Internal costs to the merger (time spent on
merger review by merging firms) are also sizable. The cost in hours for a
merger review was 81 person weeks (with a median of 25 person weeks). Indepth investigations consumed an average of 120 person weeks (with a median
of 29 person weeks).85 Streamlining practices across jurisdictions could reduce
a number of these costs. Harmonized practices may reduce delays and
differential timing and better tailor investigations to determine if a proposed
transaction raises anticompetitive concerns. Merger review may take up
significant resources within an antitrust agency. Better coordination means
fewer resources expended in the document-intensive merger review process,
freeing up resources to focus on other conduct where anticompetitive conduct
is more likely. Nevertheless, despite their costs and potential inefficiencies,
merger control regimes assume that they create more benefits than costs
86
overall.
2. The Weakness ofExisting Domestic Merger Review
International mergers present a number of potential costs that may increase
costs and delays beyond those faced in domestic mergers. Competitors may use
international merger control to manipulate government investigations and raise
merger costs for efficient merging parties. In other situations, countries and
their antitrust agencies may hold up mergers that have only limited
anticompetitive effects. Merger remedies may be incompatible across
jurisdictions. On the substantive merger analysis level, different substantive
standards may lead to disparate results across jurisdictions. Divergent remedies
may lead to potentially contradictory results.
Accordingly, domestic systems seem unable to control the international
spillover costs of international mergers. To say this is a problem presumes that
reducing the operational costs of mergers is desirable. An alternative to
reducing operational costs is to keep the cost of merger review purposely high.
Government may want to keep the cost high in order to ensure that firms will
go through the expense of mergers only if they are sure that efficiencies would
result. 87 Mainstream industrial organization and regulatory economics thinking
85. ICN, REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BURDENS OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL MERGER REVIEW 7-9
(2004).
86. Any antitrust system that has merger control makes this assumption. Systematically proving
this assumption remains an academic challenge. See Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students
of Business and Students ofA ntitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2003).
87. Knowledge@Wharton,
Why
Do
So
Many
Mergers
Fail?,

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1137 (March 30, 2005) (between 50 and 80
percent of all mergers fail to create efficiencies over the long run).
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over-interference
tends to push for the former solution rather than the latter, as 88
benefits.
than
harms
more
create
may
markets
in
by regulators
Sovereignty concerns affect an agency's decision to hold up a merger even
if it would enhance allocative efficiency globally. As more jurisdictions have
accepted extraterritoriality, a unified approach to mergers has become more
difficult. 89 In many cases, a merger may have only a small impact on a
particular country. Where the country-specific impact is negligible and the deal
for countries only tangentially affected not to
is global, it may be more efficient
9
0
merger.
proposed
a
challenge
Decisions to approve mergers may have both national and global welfare
enhancing effects. In some cases, a country may approve a domestic merger or
not because of a national benefit or loss even where the effect globally would
be the opposite. Because of global reach and impact, firms may decide to go
through with their mergers no matter what the economic consequences to a
particular country, particularly if that country has only a small economy. Thus
some countries lack the ability to participate in the regulation of international
91
mergers and the means to protect themselves from potentially harmful effects.
This is a long-term problem that implicates the ability of agencies-and indeed
countries-to participate in the shaping of international merger control.
Of course, the opposite is also possible. A single country can hold up
consummation of a merger, adding significant costs to or even scuttling the
proposed deal entirely. Mergers may have different effects in different
jurisdictions based on the size and the dynamics of a particular economy. If a
single agency can hold up an international merger, merger control becomes a
function of the weakest link on substantive concerns. One way to reduce costs
is to have the agency most affected by a proposed merger take the lead in
global efforts. This may result in fewer information costs and potentially better
knowledge and decision making. When this happens, which agency takes the
lead in merger review becomes an issue. The choice can potentially alter the
coordination costs of review. For agencies to decide on one of their number to
take the lead, they must trust in their sister agency's methods of analysis of the
potential effects of a merger.
Issues that affect the operations of a domestic merger control system create
additional transaction costs. Some merger systems have onerous filing
88. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 (1978). (noting that markets may be better
than regulators at punishing bad corporate decision making).
89. William Blumenthal, The Challenge of Sovereignty and the Mechanisms of Convergence, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 267, 272 (2004).
90. Similar sentiments exist regarding state antitrust enforcement in the U.S. context. See Robert H.
Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A ProposedFederal/StateBalance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 1047, 1064 (1990).
91. Fox, supra note 1, at 922; Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging
Markets: Internationaland Developmental Dimensions (Harvard University/UNCTAD-G24, Working
Paper No. 18, 2002).
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requirements that require notification of transactions for review even when the
jurisdiction in question lacks any nexus to the transaction. Additionally,
systems may create unnecessary restrictions as to the timing of filing. This
implicates the triggering of a transaction's formal review. In other settings,
initial filing requirements may ask for information not necessary for an initial
determination of whether a proposed transaction might require a more in-depth
investigation. The increase in the number of merger regimes worldwide, each
with its own standards, suggests that a purely domestic solution to reduce
be inadequate. 92
inefficient operational standards of merger review may
93
Instead, the problem may require a supranational solution.
Merger control may fix a potentially anticompetitive problem in one
country but not in others. A divestiture in a third country might be the best
outcome, but current global merger control does not allow for this (except in
the EU). A firm that pursues anticompetitive conduct may benefit a country if
the rents extracted from overcharges as a result of the merger can accrue in the
home jurisdiction of the merged company. If all the anticompetitive effects
occur abroad but the benefits occur in the home jurisdiction, this presents a
strategic9 4 trade rationale for a country to support a globally anticompetitive
merger.

C. MarketAccess
1. Problem Defined

Market access refers to the conditions for the entry of goods and services
into a country's markets. 95 It is an area in which antitrust interfaces with
international trade. The issue of market access illustrates the difference
between trade and antitrust. Trade practitioners view discrimination between
foreign and domestic companies as a potential problem even if there is no
antitrust harm. 96 If there is discrimination between foreign and domestic
producers, this may serve as the basis for a trade complaint over market

92. See, e.g., Bus. AND INDUS. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE OECD [BIAC], RECOMMENDED
FRAMEWORK FOR BEST PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (2001); ICN,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (2005).
93.

Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Law on a Global Scale-Races Up, Down and Sideways, in

REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 358 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin

eds., 2001).
94. Such concerns may be theoretically possible but unlikely. Recent work shows that the
allocation of jurisdiction for mergers between national and a supranational regulator has only a small
effect on the outcome of a merger. Neven & R6ller, supranote 1.
95. For a summary of the various approaches to measure market access, see R. Preston McAfee,
Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, What Is a Barrierto Entry?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 461 (2004).
96. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
478, 489-94 (2000).
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access. 97 In contrast, antitrust generally looks at consumer harm, whether or not
there is access for competitors. How best to address market access in which
both international trade and antitrust play a role remains contentious. 98 Both
antitrust and trade address similar but not the same types of concerns.
Issues of market access implicate the larger question of what makes a
market contestable. A contestable market does not have significant barriers to
deter new entrants. 99 Though it is difficult to measure market contestability,
market concentration, prices, profits, and modeling provide a better sense of the
contestability of such markets. 100 A number of factors affect the degree of
market contestability, including economies of scale, history and experience in a
market, natural and geographic barriers, government-erected barriers, and
private restraints. 101 The question of market contestability concerns both
antitrust and trade because increased trade liberalization might allow privately
imposed restraints to replace government-imposed barriers.
2. Lack ofAgreement Between Antitrust andInternationalTrade

Antitrust and international trade take substantively different analytical
approaches to determine whether there is sufficient market access. As a result,
what one field views as sufficient access the other may view as insufficient.
Likewise, there are cases in which antitrust and international trade find
overlapping agreement on market access. The differences in the systems have
potentially significant consequences. There may be cases in which
anticompetitive behavior that limits market access may escape remedy in either
trade or antitrust.' 0 2 In other cases, trade and antitrust may lead to conflicting
remedies (or nonremedies).

97. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION §§

4.4-4.5 (2005).
98. Bernard Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the
World Trade Organization 18-19 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2917, 2002). See,
e.g., Fox, Millennium Round, supra note 43, at 671-72 (advocating a choice of law principle to
discipline private market access restraints); KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS

OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 148-62 (2002) (advocating increased non-violation WTO cases); John
0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of InternationalAntitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L.

REV. 549 (2003) (arguing for national treatment to overcome market access problems to open domestic
markets); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality:
Defining the Domains of Trade and Antitrust Policy, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST

JURISDICTION INTHE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 152 (advocating national treatment to open up
foreign markets).
99. Barriers may be permanent barriers or barriers that can be used to delay for a significant period
of time. See Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriersto Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 471
(2004).
100. Edward M. Graham & Robert Z. Lawrence, Measuring the International Contestability of
Markets: A ConceptualApproach, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO's FirstAntitrust Case-Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for
Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 271, 271 (2006).
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The differences between trade and antitrust play themselves out when
foreign firms try to enter new markets. Smaller economies in particular tend to
have more concentrated markets. 103 Competition by foreign producers
overcomes this concentration. Concentrated markets may be more likely to
create opportunities for anticompetitive conduct. International trade can reduce
concentration in tradable sectors. It provides for effective rivalry between
domestic and foreign sources where a market might otherwise not have
domestic rivals. 1°4 However, where there are concentrated markets, existing
firms may be able to lock up distribution channels. This conduct implicates
what antitrust terms "vertical restraints."
3. Vertical Restraints and Market Access

The issue of vertical restraints is tied to market access issues of
international trade. Intellectual divergence in how to view vertical restraints
adds to the complexity of coming to consensus on how to address them.
Vertical restraints are more pronounced in concentrated markets if competitors
control vertically linked markets. 105 Exclusive dealing arrangements may
foreclose markets to efficient competitors. 106 This can occur as incumbent
suppliers share their rents with certain distributors when they deal with other
distributors. Often foreign producers are the potential entrants into new
markets. When vertical restraints reduce entry into these markets, the restraints
may have a protectionist effect.10 7 Thus, vertical distributional restraints take on
both trade and antitrust dimensions.
Vertical market access restraints are an area of particular disagreement
around the world, both within antitrust and between antitrist and international
10 8
trade. Vertical restraints create potential higher search costs for customers.
Whereas some countries believe that market access solutions to vertical
restraints and allocative efficiency are symbiotic, the Chicago School of
economics does not. 10 9 Rather, the Chicago School views vertical restraints as

103.

MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003).

104. World Trade Organization, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and CompetitionPolicy to the General Council, 39, WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998).
105. MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 22 (2003).
106. Patrick Rey, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, in ECONOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT
WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH STIGLITZ 247 (Richard Amott, Bruce Greenwald, Ravi Kanbur &
Barry Nalebuff eds., 2003).
107. William Comanor & Patrick Rey, Competition Policy Towards Vertical Foreclosure in a
Global Economy, 23 INT'L BUS. L. 465, 468 (1995).

108. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition,
26 RAND J. EcON. 431 (1995).

109. Eleanor M. Fox, US and European Merger Policy-FaultLines and Bridges: Mergers That
Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 471, 478 (2002); Michael H.
Riordan, Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 1232 (1998).
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presumptively procompetitive. "'
According to the Chicago School, vertical restraints create potential
efficiencies that generally outweigh their costs. Vertical restraints eliminate the
free rider problem, for example. Without addressing the free rider problem,
companies lack an incentive to invest in research and development. Vertical
restraints allow companies to coordinate decision making.' 1 They also allow
companies to eliminate the double margin problem,
in which both upstream and
1 12
downstream monopolists charge monopoly prices.
This approach has implications on how to analyze market contestability in
vertically integrated markets. If a market is already contestable, firms price
their products competitively rather than at a price higher than the competitive
price. A competitive price does not encourage foreign producers to enter a
market. The mere threat of entry (and competition) should in theory prevent an
incumbent from demanding a supracompetitive price lest the incumbent be
undercut by a competitively priced entrant." 13 Nor does a highly concentrated
market in itself necessarily mean that the market is not competitive. Rather,
high concentration may reflect1 4 economies of scale where inefficient
competitors have exited a market.
A lack of foreign competitors in a market should not lead to presumptions
that the market has significant anticompetitive problems and that governmentor firm-erected barriers may be preventing foreign firm entry. Many factors can
explain lack of market access, and not all of them result from anticompetitive
behavior. A lack of entrants may result from other prohibitive costs, such as
international transportation costs, production costs, and the costs of catching up
to a domestic firm's first-mover advantage in setting up a distribution
network. 15 Because of the multiple explanations for a lack of market access,
antitrust experts are reluctant to accept sweeping claims of market access
problems without a fact-intensive inquiry to establish consumer harm from a
market access or refusal-to-deal situation. 116

110. Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 240-41

(2005); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATON 186 (1988); Alan J. Meese,
Exclusive Dealing and the Theory of the Firm, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 371 (2005). This explains the rule
of reason approach in the United States and a number of other jurisdictions.
11.

Michael H. Riordan, What is Vertical Integration?,in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES 94

(Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustafsson & Oliver E. Williamson eds., 1990).
112. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION VOLUME 3 (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., forthcoming).
113. William Baumol & Robert Willig, Fixed Costs, Entry Barriers and the Sustainability of
Monopoly, 96 Q. J. ECON. 405 (1981).
114. See, e.g., MARK J. ROBERTS & JAMES R. TYBOUT, INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: MICRO PATTERNS OF TURNOVER, PRODUCTIVITY, AND MARKET STRUCTURE (1996).

115. Simon Evenett & Valerie Suslow, Preconditionsfor Market Access and InternationalCartels,
3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 593 (2000).
116. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-Why
Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659 (2001).
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Different antitrust jurisdictions may have alternative conceptualizations of
vertical restraints. Even when countries have many of the same substantive
provisions in their antitrust laws, they may still apply these laws differently.17
Other jurisdictions may have noneconomic concerns that compete with
efficiency rationales for vertical restraints.118 Noneconomic concerns may have
objectives other than efficiency. These goals may include protection of smaller
firms, social justice, countering the power of upstream firms, or political
populism that distrusts concentrations of power.' 19 Such differences in rationale
speak to the larger question of the possible goal(s) of antitrust. 12° Moreover,
even in the United States, some post-Chicago School antitrust1 thinking
suggests that there may be reason for concern as to vertical restraints. 21
A second divergence within antitrust is that a number of developing
countries view the Chicago School understanding of market access and vertical
restraints as based on assumptions best suited to a developed world, mature
economy model. They may argue that the situation in the developing world
requires a less permissive view of vertical restraints. Likewise, some within the
developed world take a more populist view that each country should decide on
its own what a market access restraint might mean in terms of vertical
restraints.122
4. The Limits ofAntitrust

In many cases, international market access problems may be a function of
government restraints. Market access barriers are a cost caused by legislative
and regulatory malfunctions. Government-created barriers are particularly
difficult to measure. 2 3 In some cases, the government itself blocks competition
through tariff barriers and regulations that prevent entry of other firms to
compete against government enterprises. In still other situations, government
action or inaction facilitates the existing anticompetitive practices of private
117. Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive
Effect?, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002).
118. Eleanor M. Fox, Toward WorldAntitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1997).
What is meant by "efficiency" also varies across jurisdictions. Fox, supra note 117.
119. ANDREW GAVIL, WILLIAM KOVACIC & JONATHAN BAKER, ANTITRUST
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 31-33 (2002).

LAW

IN

120. Robert Pitofsky as Chairman of the FTC stated, "You can't expect countries at such different
levels of economic development to have all the same answers to competition policy issues." FTC
ChairmanSays World Competition Rules Currently Not Feasible,INSIDE US TRADE, Apr. 26, 1996, at

15.
121. Increasingly, post-Chicago School antitrust has used game theory to find situations that justify
a less permissive view of vertical restraints. See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of
Vertical Integration (Working Paper, 2005); Peter C. Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of
DistributionRestraints: The Efficiency Hypothesis Versus the Rent-Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (2001), for a number of Chicago School critiques.
122. Fox, supra note 118, at 23-24; Fox, Millennium Round, supranote 43, at 670-73.
123. OECD, Barriersto Entry, DAF/COMP(2005)42, 10.
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firms.
Antitrust may have trouble remedying the potential harm of vertical
restraints where the government itself has imposed them. It can be difficult to
determine whether a particular case of limited market access harms efficiency.
Antitrust is not always equipped to address cases in which the government acts
to insulate anticompetitive behavior from antitrust, as when sector regulation
exempts market participants in the sector from antitrust scrutiny. Given their
current capacities and methodologies, domestic trade and antitrust agencies and
courts may be unequipped to address on their own how these issues interface.
These institutions may see only part of a problem rather than the market access
issue in its totality.
For example, as part of a privatization process, a country may grant a
monopoly to protect against competition.' 24 Similarly, antitrust has limitations
in its ability to address situations in which government distorts competition in
other ways. Governments can erect various regulatory barriers creating explicit
or implicit subsidies that grant companies anticompetitive advantages. Through
government-facilitated conduct, firms may use "cheap" exclusions to raise the
125
cost for rivals in non-price-based ways, limiting or deterring competition.
Firms in a monopolized 1field
may apply their market power in the monopoly
26
sector.
related
a
to
sector
Such exclusions may allow firms to use regulation to assist in successful
predation strategies. Predation strategies may succeed when firms can crosssubsidize from a regulated sector to an unregulated sector. Information
asymmetries prevent regulators from determining which costs come from
efficient operations and which derive from predatory pricing. 127 Existing
domestic legal doctrine often fails to capture such strategies in its test for
predatory pricing. 128 Where companies need not be concerned with pricing
below marginal cost, as is the case with some state-owned firms, predation
tests, such as those the United States uses, may not detect the anticompetitive
behavior. When predation strategy creates market access barriers to foreign

124. OECD, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT: COMPETITION POLICY, GLOBAL FORUM ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 5 (2005).

125. Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap
Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005).
126. See, e.g., RICK GEDDES, SAVING THE MAIL: HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.

POSTAL SERVICE (2003); D. Daniel Sokol, Express Delivery and the Postal Sector in the Context of
PublicSector Anti-Competitive Practices,23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 353 (2003).
127. Antoine Faure-Grimaud, The Regulation of PredatoryFirms, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY

850 (1997).
128. The United States tests for predation would not capture pricing below marginal cost by state
owned enterprises (SOEs). For the U.S. tests see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993); UnitedStates v AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). On an
alternative approach that would capture SOE anticompetitive behavior, see David E. M. Sappington & J.
Gregory Sidak, Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG.
183 (2003).
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entrants, it distorts trade.
Even when antitrust agencies have knowledge of and the ability to act on
anticompetitive conduct, prosecutorial discretion may restrain them from taking
action. Antitrust agencies that can act may simply choose not to act. 129 Inaction
may result from public choice concerns.1 30 An agency may fear that legislators
will oppose its taking on a powerful local interest to benefit the country's
consumers (perhaps because this would also benefit foreign entrants). These
legislators could threaten to cut funding to the agency or create antitrust
exemptions allowing anticompetitive behavior to continue without any agencylevel check. Thus, an antitrust agency's prosecutorial discretion is a potential
market access barrier. 13 1 Similarly, a country's weak antitrust system may serve
as a nontariff barrier deterring foreign entrants into its market, because the
system permits domestic firms to create anticompetitive barriers which raise
costs for rivals.132 Domestic antitrust may not function as well as international
antitrust to resolve these concerns.
IV. THEORETICAL TOOLS

A. Using ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis

The purpose of this Part is to provide an overall framework of comparative
institutional analysis to apply to the problems of international antitrust. This
Article undertakes much of the detailed examination of comparative
institutional analysis and international relations through a discussion of the case
studies and the institutional alternatives. Comparative institutional analysis
determines each potential institutional alternative's ability to allocate resources
within society effectively.' 33 Single institution analyses, or analyses that do not
address all relevant and critical institutions, can only fail to establish the
optimal institutional response. A limited analysis of institutional choices may
overlook other institutions that are already available, better suited, or more
easily reformed to address policy concerns more effectively. Where institutions
succeed and fail relative to other institutional choices determines the optimal

129. Eleanor Fox, Should Competition Join the WTO?, in THE NEXT TRADE NEGOTIATING ROUND:
EXAMINING THE AGENDA FOR SEATTLE 121 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1999).

130. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (3d ed. 2003) (reviewing recent literature in public
choice theory).
13 1. World Trade Organization, Panel Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting ConsumerPhotographic
Film andPaper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998).
132.
World Trade Organization, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), at para. 186; Stephen F. Hamilton &
Kyle W. Stiegert, Vertical Coordination,Antitrust Law, and International Trade, 43 J. L. & ECON. 143

(2000); Patrick Rey, Competition Policy and Economic Development 33 (World Bank Working Paper,
1997).
133.

KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 31.
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institutional policy response.
Comparative institutional analysis provides a framework to understand
institutional choice as the decision-making process. Comparative institutional
analysis focuses on a cost-benefit analysis of potential institutions. 134 The
decision-making process arrives at its choice through comparative cost-benefit
analysis of available institutions. Every institution has its imperfections. These
imperfections vary across institutions both domestically and internationally.
Each institution requires different intervention strategies to make it more
effective. Yet, these very interventions create potential problems due to the
particular malfunctions of each institution.
Costs shape the ability of institutions to be effective. 35 Benefits of
membership shape the distribution of participants' stakes in particular
institutions. Institutional behavior is a function of participation in an institution.
It is participation that shapes this cost-benefit analysis. Participation looks to
the distribution of benefits. Participation is effective when the benefits of
participation outweigh its costs. As a consequence of the international
dimension of antitrust, this cost-benefit analysis must address both horizontal
(domestic) and vertical (international) axes. That is, such an analysis must
examine institutions at the domestic level (courts, legislatures, and regulatory
agencies) as well as at the level of different international institutions (the ICN,
WTO, regional trade agreements, UNCTAD, and OECD).
Whenever government and market interact, this creates difficult issues for
institutional choice.1 36 Antitrust is a question of when to rely on markets as an
institution and when to choose a nonmarket institutional response. Comparative
institutional analysis for antitrust does not ask, for example, how well the
market works on its own as an institution. Rather, it asks whether markets work
better than administrative agencies or courts. Put differently, participation costs
are present in markets, the courts, and domestic or international regulatory
systems. Each institution creates waste or friction. Therefore, the best question
137
to ask (and answer) is which system will create the least waste or friction.
B. Institutions, Costs, and Benefits
1. Costs and Complexity

Policy choices must consider transaction costs of particular institutional
choices. 138 These costs help to determine the appropriate institutions.
134. Id. at 23.
135. Id. at 42-60.
136. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supranote 2, at 122.

137. See id. at 29.
138. AVINASH

K. DIXIT, THE

MAKING OF

ECONOMIC

POLICY:
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Williamson defines transaction costs as the "comparative costs of planning,
adopting and monitoring task completion under alternative governance
structures."' 139 The transaction costs of particular institutional alternatives may
explain countries' use of more formal or informal agreements and
institutions. 140 Any agreement or institution involves costs.
or
Transaction costs help determine whether to choose domestic 141
institutions.
these
in
involved
countries
benefit
to
institutions
international
When transaction costs are high, the transaction takes effect through more
formal organizations. When there is a higher potential return on such a
transaction, countries may be more willing to overcome the high transaction
cost for the negotiation of binding rules. 142 Where the costs of binding rules are
too high, informal mechanisms (such as soft law) may be set up in their
place. 143 Even with the use of informal mechanisms such as benchmarking and
the creation of best practices, the payoff for benchmarking appropriate behavior
determines whether the transaction costs of negotiating such benchmarks
within a soft law institution are too high. Part V discusses the nature of these
cost-and-benefit tradeoffs in detail.
Increased complexity reduces the effectiveness of any institutional
alternative. In like manner, factors that make the market less effective also
make courts or agencies less effective. 144 Issues of power dynamics,
participation, coordination costs, and substantive disagreement occur in each of
the case studies examined in the previous Section. Choosing the best
institutional alternative may require better information. A lack of information
may implicate high participation costs in the institution. Moreover, the
decision-making process may suffer from lack of resources or an inability to
resolve issues quickly. 145 The previous Section, which examines the complexity
of cartels, mergers, and market access, also illustrates that complexity's impact
on domestic institutions and their capacity to address the problems in these
areas. Information costs also play an important role in a legal system. Any legal

PERSPECTIVE (1996); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
139. Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135, 142 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).

140.

Michael J. Gilligan, A Defense of the Transactions Costs Approach to Understanding

International Institutions, in POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD
POLITICS: RESEARCH FRONTIERS 10 (Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds., forthcoming).
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
141.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 166-67 (1989). Note, however, that in Keohane's model, the
primary actors in international relations are states.
142. Gilligan, supra note 140.

143. Armin Schafer, Resolving Deadlock: Why InternationalOrganizationsIntroduce Soft Law, 12
EUR. L.J. 194 (2006). Informal mechanisms make it more likely that some level for compromise among
parties can be reached because they are not rules as much as benchmarks for behavior. The discussion
infra details the mechanisms that make soft law more flexible than hard law.
144. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 23.
145. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
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institution requires information to make policy. High information costs may
undermine the ability of any institution46to make optimal choices regarding
consumption, production, or investment. 1
2. Participation

A discussion of participation's effects leads to questions of institutional
legitimacy. All institutions face questions of legitimacy. 147 This holds for both
international and domestic institutions. For example, in any representative
democracy, legislators at the national level look to constituent interests in the
aggregate rather than individually. In some countries there is no direct election
of the executive or judges. The executive often appoints the heads of regulatory
agencies and judges. International organizations are yet a further step removed
from direct voter preferences. The ways these different institutions function
reflect efforts to reduce malfunctions caused by limits on direct participation of
all stakeholders. Comparative institutional analysis examines these institutional
alternatives' participatory strengths and weaknesses, which helps to answer
questions of institutional legitimacy.
Participation occurs at a number of levels. This is clear from the historical
analysis provided in Part II. The dynamics of participation and its costs and
benefits become even clearer in Part V's discussion of the various antitrust
institutions. Each individual participant may participate in the market or the
state through the legislative or legal process. However, the effectiveness of
participation varies based on the costs and benefits of participation. Indeed, the
nature of participation varies across institutions, as do the costs of
participation. 148 If participation costs are high, many potential participants may
be uninformed, due to the high cost of information.149 As a result, actors may
make decisions not in their own interests. In the market, consumers with
incomplete information may purchase overpriced products available elsewhere

146. See Damian Geradin & J. Gregory Sidak, European and American Approaches to Antitrust
Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications, in HANDBOOK OF

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 1, 2 (Martin E. Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar & Ingo Vogelsang eds.,
2006).
147. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 122.

148. Abilities and dynamics of domestic institutions vary across countries. The nature of
adjudication is different for example in common law versus civil law jurisdictions. The role and power
of administrative agencies also vary across jurisdictions. The specific nature of these institutions and
their capabilities may vary based on the legal system and tradition in a given country. Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External
Finance,52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). The discussion in this Part on

participation reflects an attempt to draw more general lessons for each type of institutional choice and
structure as they concern international antitrust issues. The application of this discussion to particular
institutions, though stronger in the aggregate, may be weaker as it pertains to individual cases.
149. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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for less.' In the political process, participation costs may cause consumers to
support legislation that is not in their interest. 15 1 For example, proponents may
sell legislation as benefiting the economy when in fact it helps only a single
interest group. This can result from public choice problems, in which small
interest groups push for legislation that favors them at the expense of society
overall. In antitrust, this might include special provisions that exempt an
industry from antitrust scrutiny. For example, the United States and EU each
offer some form of antitrust immunity for their airline industries."' Such
antitrust immunities may not serve the aggregate interests of consumers.
Rather, these immunities may raise prices for consumers. 53
In courts or administrative agencies, whether domestic or international,
regulatory complexity and voluminous paper records increase participation
costs. Increased costs have implications for participation in these institutions, as
well as for who sets the agenda of these institutions. Those who participate
more effectively have an increased opportunity to shape the outputs of the
institution. 154 Individual actors with deeper pockets can participate more
effectively than those with fewer financial resources. 155 Likewise, larger-sized
56
firms with deep pockets can participate more effectively than smaller firms.'
Because there is an international dimension to participation, some ascribe a
single voice to a state, particularly as it participates in the creation of binding
international commitments. However, participation has various components at
both national and international levels. As international relations scholars
explain, domestic and international decisions are intertwined. 157 This introduces
the second analytical tool this Article employs-international relations theory.

150. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, Information Remedies for Consumer
Protection,71 AM. ECON. REV. 410 (1981); Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981).
151. Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New Perspective on
the "Central Obsession" of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004).
152. Airline Flight Schedule Exemption, 49 U.S.C. § 40129 (2003); REGULATION 1617/93 (IATA

Tariff and Slot Conferences).
153. Alden F. Abbott, Associate Director for Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission
Hearings on Immunities and Exemptions (Dec. 1, 2005). See generally MUELLER, supra note 130.
154.

KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supranote 2, at 99.

155. Roland Benabou, Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 96 (2000).

156. Matilde Bombardini, Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation(Working Paper, on file
with the University of British Columbia Department of Economics, June 2005).
157. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427 (1988); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Domestic Politics and InternationalRelations, 46
INT'L STUD. Q. 1 (2002); Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating Internationaland Domestic
Theories of InternationalBargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING

AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993).
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C. InternationalOrganizationsandAntitrust

Scholars have applied international organization theory to antitrust. Yet,
this international organization literature omits several critical antitrust
institutions in its analysis. This creates gaps in previous work. 158 Earlier
scholarship incorporating socio-legal explanations of international relations
argues that all models of global governance need to operate in international
antitrust. 159 Such an approach is incomplete. It fails to provide a framework to
determine the best institutional form to address a given problem. It also does
not account for "who decides who decides." 160 That is, these previous
approaches do not address who to choose among institutions as to the most
effective decision maker. To create effective policy prescriptions on the
appropriate design of international antitrust institutions requires filling in these
theoretical gaps.
International institutions play an increasingly large role as regulatory issues
globalize. 161 International regulatory law allows countries the freedom to create

new commitments and institutional arrangements. This makes the use of
comparative international analysis more compelling.1 62 Institutions can evolve
as they adopt the best practices of other institutions. Alternatively, an
institution may evolve as states choose it over other existing institutions
because it better serves a particular function.
International organizations help create rules and norms. A norm is a

common belief or standard of what is acceptable (i.e., normal). Norms function
to create order in society by creating customs of reiterated behavior.
Internationally, norm creation occurs when multiple countries (or their substate decisionmakers) view a particular type of conduct through a similar

158. For example, these works ignore the importance of the ICN, which this paper discusses in
detail in Part V. Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International
Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003); Imelda Maher, Competition Law in the
InternationalDomain: Networks as a New Form of Governance, 29 J.L. & SOC'Y 111 (2002); Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of InternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future
of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 86 (2002). Anne-Marie Slaughter provides a brief, oneparagraph description of the ICN in her book on the new order of soft law institutions. ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 175 (2004). Many of the international antitrust works on
institutions also fail to address the proliferation of the use of regional and bilateral trade agreements with
antitrust chapters.
159. Piilola, supra note 158, at 209.
160.

KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supranote 2, at 3.

161. Steinberg, supra note 45; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational
Design of InternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761 (2001). This Article does not seek to create a
larger theory of why states may comply with international law. Rather, within the examination of
institutions, it has the more modest goal of exploring what sort of institutional choices and arrangements
may lead to increased compliance for issues involving international antitrust. The examination of
international antitrust institutions provides a multicausal explanation of the dynamics of international
organizations.
162. Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the InternationalEconomic
Organization:Toward ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470, 503 (1996).
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conceptual framework. Sub-state actors repeat behavior that follows from this
group conceptualization. As these norms take hold, international relations
theory suggests that such behavior in turn creates domestic compliance. 163
These customs in turn reinforce compliance. Assuming that such behavior leads
to compliance, as discussed in Part V, it can benefit those actors, such as
antitrust agencies, that hold to norms. Each such actor therefore has a rational
basis for norm creation.
From a game theory perspective, parties conform to norms because they
will receive long-term benefit from doing so. 164 International antitrust
institutions offer such potential benefits to participants. Participation allows
members of these organizations to increase cooperation and share information,
resources, and expertise. Because of increased cooperation, international
organizations constrain behavior through norm-facilitation. This reduces
transaction costs. 165 Over time, rules of international organizations become
accepted norms. States internalize them. In this way, international law can
diffuse into domestic laws. 166 Imbedded localized norms may increase
compliance. Part V's discussion provides examples of norm-facilitation in
international antitrust.
Just as international organizations create incentives for compliance, they
create disincentives for noncompliance, in the form of punishments. For
example, international organizations can impose reputational costs on states for
noncompliance. 167 Loss of reputation matters when the loss has
consequences. 68 In addition, organizations can impose financial penalties or
other forms of retaliation. These costs may increase compliance among
members of international organizations.
D. The Role of InternationalInstitutionsand its Application to International
Antitrust

International organizations reflect different institutional styles. The basic
divide of institutional structure is between hard and soft law institutions. These
organizations constrain behavior for domestic institutions differently. The
discussion of hard and soft law and their costs and benefits requires
163. Martha Finnamore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change,
52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
164. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).

165.
166.
167.
Law, 144
168.

Finnamore & Sikkink, supranote 163.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
Koremenos, et al., supra note 161, at 790; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032 (1996).
Edith Brown Weiss, Conclusions: UnderstandingCompliance with Soft Law, in COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 541
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and
Development, in THE

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW ON INTERNATIONAL

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 121 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
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international organization literature to explain how international antitrust
institutions may create mechanisms for antitrust compliance.
1. The Use ofHardLaw Institutions

The international organization literature describes hard law as part of a twolevel game. At Level I, governments bargain among themselves to
institutionalize arrangements and commitments that maximize benefits for their
domestic constituents.1 69 At Level II, on the other hand, domestic constraints
limit the ability of governments to pursue foreign policy objectives.
Domestically, interest groups seek to shape government policy so as to further
their own interests. In game theory terms, policy at the domestic level
establishes the possible win-set for a country in international negotiations.
Countries enter into a Level I international agreement only when it falls within
their respective Level II win-sets.
Countries address the two-level game by creating international
commitments that lock in domestic policies to international policies. To
increase compatibility, countries lock in domestic policies to international ones
in order to make domestic compliance more credible. 170 The types of
commitments undertaken express preference as to institutional choice. This
suggests foreign economic policy is an effort to synchronize domestic policies
with the international political economy.
Once countries create a binding agreement, the nature of participation
varies because the institutional mechanisms change. The two-level game for
treaty negotiation favors executive power as the institutional choice.' 72 It is the
executive branch that sets the negotiating agenda and negotiates treaties. Once
an agreement is established, however, institutional choice may shift. In the
antitrust setting, a binding international commitment changes the institutional
choice. As Part V.A. 1 explores in detail, the institution of choice for binding
antitrust is the WTO.
Binding international commitments show a preference for international
adjudication as the institutional choice. Hard law involves precise obligations
that bind state actors. WTO provisions are vague, so adjudication plays a
significant role in determining meaning of the text. Under hard law delegation,
169. Helen Milner, RationalizingPolitics: The EmergingSynthesis of International,American, and
Comparative Politics, in EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS 139
(Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner eds., 1999).
170. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427, 457-59 (1988).
171. Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of
Foreign Economic Policy, in BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES 3, 3-4 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1978).

172. Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of InternationalAgreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501,
540 (2005).
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countries cede their authority to a neutral implementing institution. 173 This
makes WTO adjudicators the primary institutional movers in the WTO.174
Antitrust hard law operates within the context of trade agreements.
Increased centralization of authority under hard law may increase compliance
through the threat of enforcement via dispute settlement.'1 75 Trade agreements
may lead to increased compliance because they tie the hands of domestic-level
participants (courts, legislators, and executives). Such agreements also tend to
strengthen the hand of domestically based exporters. Exporters benefit from
compliance with trade agreements, in the form of increased exports to other
markets. Thus exporters have a vested interest in the domestic political process
to ensure that domestic noncompliance does not threaten these foreign market
opportunities.176
In this manner, trade agreements have two levels of domestic commitmentmaking. At one level, trade agreements limit the discretion of domestic
governments to pursue certain policies. At another level, they serve as
commitments to voters for less protectionist policies. 1 77 These commitments
may limit the market access and spillover problems that concern international
antitrust.
2. The Design of Soft Law Institutions
Soft law institutions have become increasingly important among
international institutions.' One international relations theorist defines soft law
as "rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but
which nevertheless may have practical effects. ' ' 17 9 Soft law allows for multiple
approaches within a common framework to solve problems. Because soft law
lacks the power to bind through treaty, soft law institutions allow greater
flexibility and adaptability in their recommendations and norms.' Part V.B's
173. Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction:
Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000).
174. Gregory C. Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates?Who Decides?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 470 (2004).
175. Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in InternationalLaw, 92 VA. L. REV. 251,

259 (2006).
176. Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797,
814 (2005).
177. Helen V. Milner, B. Peter Rosendorff & Edward D. Mansfield, International Trade and
Domestic Politics: The Domestic Sources of International Trade Agreements and Institutions, in THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 216

(Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
178. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferationof Actors in the InternationalSystem,
in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL

ORTHODOXY 12 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).
179. Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMILE NOtL 197, 198 (Stephen Martin ed., 1994).

180. Soft law involves weaker levels of one or more of (1)obligation; (2) precision; or (3)
delegation. Soft law is dynamic as it can occur at one or more of these dimensions. Kenneth W. Abbott
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discussion of the OECD, UNCTAD, and ICN explains these dynamics.
The literature on the two-level game has, for the most part, focused on the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Cooperation
through soft law, however, is usually the domain of domestic regulators across
jurisdictions. 181 The choice of soft law institutions over international
adjudication is an institutional choice made for administrative agencies. This
changes Level II of the game, substituting agencies for the legislature. In this
new two-level model, the relationship
between the executive and the antitrust
18 2
agency is one of principal-agent.
Where the principal is the executive and its agent is an antitrust agency, the
forum for antitrust problem is inter-agency deliberation through
transgovernmental or transnational international organizations. The agent's
interests may not align with those of the principal. Delegation to international
organizations may involve a moral hazard problem. An agent may pursue his
own objectives rather than those of his principal. The principal must create
mechanisms, ex ante through bonding and ex post through monitoring, to limit
the agent's opportunity to seek his own preference set. 183 Relaxing the
assumption that an antitrust agency operates with a single voice makes
understanding its participation in international organizations more complex.
Different components within the agency may be involved in these
organizations. Moreover, nonstate actor involvement in such organizations
increases the number of direct participants.
Transgovernmentalism involves this two-level game of soft law in terms of
increased rule-making and coordination at the sub-state level. The
transgovernmental organization disaggregates the function of the state to lower
levels. 184 There has been increasing growth in the use of transgovernmental
networks, particularly in regulatory fields. 185 This growing participation is
revolutionizing international organizations because it shifts the institutional
preference from the executive to the administrative agency. In international
antitrust, the OECD and the UNCTAD have transgovernmental structures.
Such transgovernmental networks have two important functions. First, they
may encourage harmonization across jurisdictions, particularly toward the
system of the dominant country within the network. Second, they affect the
distribution of regulatory power. Where power is diffuse, regulatory
& Duncan Snidal, Hardand Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 434 (2000).
181. Chad Damro, TransatlanticCompetition Policy: Domestic and InternationalSources of EUUS Cooperation, 12 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 171, 172 (2006).
182. Id. at 174.
183. For a general discussion on agency problems, see JEAN JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID
MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002).
184. HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1984); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76
FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).
185. Slaughter, supra note 184, at 184; Raustiala, supra note 158, at 4-5.
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cooperation strengthens compliance as well as the effectiveness of both formal
and informal obligations. The discussions of the OECD and UNCTAD in Parts
V.B. 1 and 2 illustrate these dynamics.
In contrast with transgovernmentalism, transnationalism is a hybrid
structure that includes participation by both state and nonstate actors. 86 The
ICN, for example, is transnational in nature. This has implications for both its
model of global governance and its participants. 87 Transnationalism suggests
that the states rely on their own subunits to work with nonstate actors such as
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and MNCs. From a more
general view, transnational actors seek to change countries' policy
preferences. 188 Nongovernmental actors help transform state actors. 189A
constructivist approach argues that through interactions with other actors, soft
law allows states' preferences to change and institutions themselves to be
transformed. 190 Part V.B.3's discussion of ICN dynamics explains how this
plays out in international antitrust and has profound implications for antitrust
institutions. As Part V.B.3 explores, the ICN has fostered increased intellectual
convergence among agencies, created compliance, and strengthened domestic
institutions.
3. Dynamics of Soft Law Institutions

Soft law systems use consensus to reach positions. Consensus requires that
countries share information about their preferences with one another. Shared
information allows countries to determine a common position that they all can
accept. This type of system works even when the cost of agreement outweighs
the cost of acceptance. As discussed in Part II, for example, the potential cost
of an antitrust agreement in the WTO was too much for certain countries to
186. THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE
ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (1995).

187. Mark Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, TransatlanticGovernance in Historical and Theoretical
Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 33 (Mark Pollack &

Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001).
188. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert 0. Keohane, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL

TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 271 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian
& Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001).
189. See generallyALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
190.

MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 141 (1996); David

M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, 'Soft Law, ' 'HardLaw,'and European Integration: Toward
a Theory of Hybridity, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Grainne de Birca & Joanne

Scott eds., forthcoming 2006) ("From an epistemological standpoint, the constructivist approach is not
interested in how things are, but in how they became what they are."). How exactly constructivism
explains this effect systematically rather than in specific situations remains underdeveloped. Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and InternationalHuman Right Law,
54 DUKE L.J. 621, 624 (2004); Stephen D. Krasner, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations:
Together, Apart, Together?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 93, 98 (2001); Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist
Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324, 325 (1998); Alastair lain Johnston,
TreatingInternationalInstitutions as Social Environments, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 487, 488 (2001).
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bear. This helped lead to the demise of the Working Group on Trade and
Competition. Similarly, the OECD Joint Group could not come to any
consensus on issues of market access. This limited the effectiveness of the Joint
Group, which led to its dissolution. When the lowest common denominator of
acceptance is too low, this outcome will be too costly for countries or their subunits to undertake such a commitment. Put differently, the costs of participation
outweigh the benefits.
Participation may vary across soft law institutions as well as within them.
Not all countries have the same bargaining power in shaping consensus within
an international organization. Two concerns within soft law institutions are
creating opportunities for meaningful participation by developing countries and
retaining the buy-in of developed countries. As Part V illustrates, some
international antitrust institutions have succeeded in fostering developing
countries' meaningful participation.
Groups with significant interests and resources may have the opportunity to
participate the most in international soft law institutions. Jacobs and Page have
studied how much impact various groups have generally at the sub-state level.
They argue that, from most important to least, international business, experts,
labor, and public opinion shape U.S. foreign policy. 91 This hierarchy of
influence also seems to hold true for international antitrust at the ICN and
OECD. The antitrust areas that have received the most coverage, particularly at
the ICN, are those which have the biggest impact on international business
mergers and, to a lesser extent, cartels and implementation of
competition/antitrust policy.
Even with agency-level participation, transgovernmental and transnational
institutions contribute to concerns of democratic accountability. As
disaggregated units become actors in international networks, power shifts
farther from democratically elected legislators, toward the executive and
administrative agencies. As regulators share technical expertise, they may
exclude domestic political economy concerns in international decision making
192
and limit deliberative democracy.
Generally, it remains an open question whether agency cooperation through
soft law institutions creates compliance or whether national governments allow
agencies to comply in order to further government interests.' 93 In antitrust, this
question is under-explored. One scholar suggests that antitrust regulators may
react to internationalization of antitrust only to the extent that their domestic
191. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin 1. Page, Who Influences US Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 107 (2005).
192. Antitrust may be the function of a domestic political bargain. Jonathan B. Baker, Competition
Policy as a PoliticalBargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 486 (2006).
193.
Compare Raustiala, supra note 158, at 86 (transgovemmental organizations shape
compliance), with Posner, supra note 176 (compliance only goes so far as domestic governments want it
to proceed).
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political institutions allow them to do so. 194 Yet, specific to the antitrust setting,
this international relations approach does not explain why different soft law
institutions yield different results in antitrust, as with the OECD, UNCTAD,
and ICN. Comparative institutional analysis offers a framework to evaluate the
relative strengths and weaknesses of these soft law institutions, as Section V
explores.
V. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

Because institutions change and respond to each other over time, a number
of the earlier writings on international antitrust do not address more recent
institutional shifts. In particular, recent years have seen important changes
suggesting that a reconsideration of the efficacy of international antitrust
institutions is in order. This Part details the dynamics of such institutions. It
analyzes their strengths and weaknesses in terms of the costs and benefits of
participation in each, in order to address the issues that the case studies present.
A. HardLaw Institutions
1. The World Trade Organization

a. Introduction
The WTO serves as a hard law institution in which countries commit to
reducing their trade barriers in exchange for other countries' commitment to the
same. The WTO operates through the process of legalization-the
institutionalization of legal governance. Legalized commitments under the
WTO alter a state's ability to interpret and change its commitments
unilaterally. 195 This makes the state's international commitments more
credible. 196 The WTO thus serves as a pre-commitment mechanism to lock in
behavior. Domestic governments embrace pre-commitment constraints so that
they can better counter domestic, rent-seeking interest groups. 97 Should a
country violate its commitments, other countries can enforce them through
legalized institutions. In this way, the WTO's binding dispute-settlement
function creates legitimacy for its commitments.'98
194. Damro, supranote 181, at 173.
195.
Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter &
Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401,426-27 (2000).
196. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create InternationalTribunals: A
Response to ProfessorsPosner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 899 (2005).
197. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On Domestic Policy
Functions ofInternationalRules, 41 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 405 (1996).
198. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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Lock-in with the WTO's international standards also has the effect of
forcing countries to develop higher standards. These standards support a
network of market-building infrastructures that support the rule of law.
Legalization therefore makes compliance more likely. Even if a country refuses
to comply with a decision by the WTO on one of its99trade policies, the decision
itself may undermine the legitimacy of that policy.'
This pattern lessens the effects of interest group capture bias on
international trade regulation. Specifically as it relates to antitrust issues, the
dynamic may be particularly true in developing countries with smaller
economies, more highly concentrated industries, and elite socioeconomic
players with strong ties to government. Under such circumstances, it is difficult
for an antitrust agency to enforce an efficiency enhancing agenda that might
harm powerful interest groups. In contrast, interest groups can mobilize more
effectively than consumers as a whole. 200 Simultaneously, consumers may have
difficulty internalizing the benefits of antitrust's impact on competition in the
aggregate to their everyday situation. 20 1 Therefore, consumers may act on
beliefs following the manipulation of the tyranny of the majority, even when
these beliefs may not actually be in their best interest. 202 For example,
consumers might support a policy such as price control, in the belief that it
helps their welfare, though in fact it creates overall losses for them.
b. Nondiscrimination in the World Trade Organization
Legalization at the WTO functions through commitments to
nondiscrimination. 203 Nondiscrimination provides equality of opportunity
between foreign and domestic market participants in a given country. As a
consequence of nondiscrimination, governments cannot put policies in place
that would benefit domestic champions over foreign market entrants. As such,
nondiscrimination makes it more difficult for countries to undertake nationalist
market policy at the expense of global allocative efficiency.
Theoretical models explain that the fundamental problem that the WTO
solves is insufficient market access. 204 Nondiscrimination reduces opportunities

199. Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution:
Interstate and Transnational,54 INT'L ORG. 457, 467 (2000).
200. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
201. ICN, CONSUMER OUTREACH BY ICN MEMBERS-A REPORT ON OUTREACH UNDERTAKEN
AND LESSONS LEARNED (2005).

202. Bryan Caplan, RationalIrrationalityand the Microfoundationsof Political Failure, 107 PUB.
CHOICE 311 (2001).
203. Alan 0. Sykes, International Trade, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
204. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 60 (2002).
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to erect market access barriers. 205 This checks domestic interest groups'
impulses. As one author points out, "[m]ost instances of discrimination against
(or underrepresentation of) foreign nationals in national political processes are,
at the same time, instances of capture of the national political process by20a6
national interest group against the interests of a dormant national majority.,
Foreign exporters tend to be underrepresented in domestic legislation.2 °7 Since
their exclusion has aggregate effects on market competition and dynamic
growth, WTO commitments assist in putting them on equal regulatory footing
with domestic firms. Nondiscrimination allows foreign exporters to participate
20 8
in domestic antitrust and overall regulation that affects their competitiveness.
c. Participation in the World Trade Organization
The WTO is an institutional choice of international adjudication of antitrust
over the malfunction of the market, domestic legislature or agencies, and soft
law intemational alternatives. Binding adjudication presumes that WTO
adjudication may be less subject to interest group capture than either the market
or the political process. The WTO could provide dispute settlement to enforce
antitrust commitments. 209 WTO members use dispute settlement to 21
retaliate
0
against trading partners that harm a previously negotiated commitment.
There are costs to WTO adjudicatory participation. Adjudication may have
limits in its ability to process information. Such limits may discourage
participation. Adjudicators have higher information costs because they are not
experts in a given subject. This reduces their ability to be precise in their
decision making. WTO adjudication may come out with inconsistent or poorly
reasoned results depending on the ability of adjudicators to come up with
solutions to complex problems. An institutional choice of
adjudication may
2 11
overwhelm the judicial decisionmakers and their resources.
The nature of adjudication under the WTO determines who has meaningful
representation. WTO adjudication has particular implications to the extent that
antitrust uses dispute settlement. Litigation increases the costs of participation

205. Oliver Budzinski & Mariana Bode, Competing Ways towards an International Competition
Policy Regime: An Economic Perspective on ICN vs. WTO, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST,
supra note 1, at 17.

206. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is as Good as It Gets?, in
RETHINKING EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 24 (J.H.H. Weiler & Margareta Wind eds., 2000).

207. John 0. McGinnis, The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalAntitrust Harmonization, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 549 (2003).

208. Maduro, supra note 206, at 15; McGinnis, supra note 207.
209. Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, InternationalCooperation on Domestic Policies: Lessons
from the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE

COOPERATION 7 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard Hoekman eds., forthcoming 2006).
210. KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, supra note 98.
211. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 239. The malfunctions of the WTO on

antitrust issues become clearer in the analysis of the recent Telmex case, as discussed infra.
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because of the complexity of rules and length of litigation. 212 Complex
litigation creates higher litigation costs. This handicaps infrequent players in
WTO adjudication because they do not use adjudicative rules as often and
therefore face higher information costs. 213 In contrast, repeat players have
lower information costs. They can adapt faster to changes in adjudication or
changes more generally in a given institution. 214 These2 costs
make participation
15
more difficult for litigants with fewer financial means.
The WTO and most preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit adjudicatory
access to states. 2 1 6 Countries participate in WTO adjudication by bringing
potential claims. This does not mean that powerful MNCs lack a voice. They
can act through their governments. This particularly benefits the United States
' 2 17
and EU because of what one author terms "public-private partnerships."
Public-private partnerships occur in a number of steps. In the U.S. setting, first
a party (a deep-pocket company or trade group) seeks congressional backing to
bring a complaint. Then, the party gives the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) information supporting the claim. Next, the party helps
select cases that the USTR has a high probability of winning. Thereafter, the
private party spends significant financial resources to assist the USTR in the
litigation. 2 18 Though the United States pioneered public-private partnerships,
the EU has begun to catch up in its use of them.219
The larger a nation's economy, the greater is its bargaining power at the
WTO.220 Traditionally this has meant countries of the developed world,
particularly the United States and EU, have held the most bargaining power.
The public-private partnerships that these countries bring to the WTO dispute
system have increased the disparity of results in hard law adjudication between
rich and poor countries.22 1 This disparity is a function of information costs.
Thus, public-private partnerships hinder meaningful participation by
developing countries in adjudication. This is not to suggest that developing
countries cannot undertake public-private partnerships. Rather, the relative

212. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supranote 2, at 37.
213. Id. at 38.

214. Id. at 162.
215. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SoC'Y REV. 165 (1974).
216. Some PTAs allow for private parties to participate in dispute resolution in antitrust. See, e.g.,

North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pt. 5, ch. 15, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
217. Gregory C. Shaffer, The Blurring of the Intergovernmental: Public-PrivatePartnerships
Behind US andEC Trade Claims, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra

note 187, at 97.
218. GREGORY C. SHAFFER, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN W.T.O. LITIGATION ch. 3 (2003).

219. Id. at ch. 4.
220. Steinberg, supra note 45, at 347.
221. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs
andTrade/World Trade OrganizationDispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003).
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costs of such partnerships remain higher for developing countries than for the
United States and EU.
The United States and EU are direct parties or third-party participants in
most WTO cases. Not surprisingly, the United States and EU understand the
adjudicatory system better than most because they are repeat players.
Information is costly. 222 Repeat play lowers the information costs of litigation.
The United States and EU gain expertise through their participation in many
cases. This expertise provides them with greater capacity to identify cases,
manage them efficiently, and increase their chances of winning them. U.S. and
EU involvement in most WTO disputes also provides them with bargaining
leverage for political disputes not settled through the WTO. Because they have
lower information costs, these parties can also inflict costs on adversaries more
effectively. 223 Their expert knowledge allows the United States and EU to
maximize their involvement in negotiation of disputes in the "shadow of the
law." 224 Such knowledge has important implications for trade law and its use in
deciding antitrust issues. Since the United States and EU participate more often
in cases, they can better transform the substance of WTO law than other
participants.225
Developing countries have a lesser ability to participate in cases decided in
the shadow of the law. This gap is due to a mismatch in legal capacity. 226 This
is a function of the relatively small value of benefits to participation and the
relatively high cost of access to participation. 227 An offending party offers its
greatest concessions in the consultation stage rather than the panel decision
stage. Developing-world litigants are unlikely to utilize this consultation period
as effectively as the repeat players for pretrial bargaining. 228 This increases
their participation costs in legal disputes.229
Even when a developing country wins in WTO adjudication, it may achieve
less than a developed world victor would. The current WTO system gives
developed world litigants more remedy choices than those available to
developing countries. If the political price for compliance is too high, a

222.

Yoram Barzel, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, 141 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 17

(1985).
223. SHAFFER, supra note 218, at 459 & n. 34.
224. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 1 (1963); AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE ch. 2 (2004).
225. SCHAFFER, supra note 218, at 471-72.
226. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GA7T/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158 (2000).
227. Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 949-50 (2004).
228. Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 221, at 720-23.
229. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISUPTES: THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO 465 (ErnstUlrich Petersmann & Mark Pollack eds., 2003).
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developed country may pay the penalty in terms of increased market access
rather than change the behavior that distorts trade. 230 A developing country
would be foolish to retaliate against a developed trading partner simply because
the developing country has very little leverage for retaliation. The developing
country may represent only a sliver of total trade for the developed country,
while the developed country may account for a significant percentage of all
trade for the developing country. Lack of leverage limits the ability of
231
developing countries to enforce WTO rulings in their favor.
Even with these limitations on effective participation, adjudication allows
developing countries to achieve better outcomes than they would in bilateral
negotiations. 232 Dispute settlement reduces the power asymmetry between a
developing country and a developed one. A developing-world complainant may
discipline U.S. or EU behavior because it can use the WTO commitment
system. A developing country may have little leverage in direct bilateral
negotiations. Under the WTO, power has become more centralized. This
centralization allows for greater justification for the imposition of sanctions or
the threat of the imposition of sanctions against noncompliant parties. 233 Parties
are likelier to commit to an outcome, even where they do not like the result.
This process forces compliance, in some cases even by powerful participants in
the WTO such as the EU and United States.
d. Ability of the World Trade Organization to Solve Antitrust Problems
i. Market Access
The capacity of the WTO to undertake an antitrust-style analysis is a
function of its ability to meld market access trade rules with antitrust notions of
barriers to entry. In some situations, a WTO policy of nondiscrimination may
solve antitrust problems. 234 However, there may be cases in which a market
access issue is not a function of anticompetitive conduct-i.e., not an antitrust
issue. The ability of the WTO to distinguish between such situations is the test
230. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization,30 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 191 (2002).
231. Brewster, supra note 175, at 257.
232. Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Fieldfor Developing Countries?
Lessons From Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND

NAFTA (John Odell ed., forthcoming 2006). WTO membership itself may help WTO countries even if
it does not benefit countries in dispute settlement. By joining the WTO, countries reduce the cost of
negotiation to receive benefits from all other member countries. Marc Busch, Rafal Raciborski & Eric
Reinhardt, Does the Rule of Law Matter? The WTO and US Antidumping Investigations (Working
Paper, August 2005).
233. Brewster, supra note 175, at 259; Jide Nzelibe, The Role and Limits of Legal Regulation of
Conflicts ofInterest (Part), 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 215 (2005).
234. BAGWELL & STAIGER, supra note 98, at ch. 9. The authors admit that not all WTO antitrust
issues are market access issues. They note that merger policy creates externalities though they leave
unresolved whether other issues may create externalities that require direct negotiation of antitrust.
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of the applicability of the WTO to market access antitrust issues.
Thus far, there have been few WTO dispute settlement adjudications that
address market access implications of antitrust directly or indirectly. 23 5 This
capacity to understand antitrust principles and apply them to a trade remedy
goes to the core of the WTO's ability to solve market access issues that
implicate antitrust. An examination of a recent such case provides a glimpse of
the adjudicatory capacity of the WTO in this area. Mexico-Measures Affecting
Telecommunications Services (hereinafter, Telmex) addressed the current WTO

competition conceptualization.23 6 The specific questions at issue in Telmex
were whether Mexico had violated its commitments and obligations under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Schedule of Commitments,
GATS Annex on Telecommunications, and the Reference Paper on
Telecommunications (RP) on practices in basic and value-added
telecommunications services. 237 In Telmex, the WTO panel stated that antitrust
issues are intractably tied to national treatment and market access. It declared:
Removing market access and national treatment barriers was not deemed sufficient
to ensure the effective realization of market access commitments in basic
telecommunications services. Accordingly many Members agreed to additional
commitments to implement a pro-competitive regulatory framework designed to
prevent continued monopoly behaviour, particularly by former monopoly operators,
and abuse of dominance by these or any other major suppliers. Members wished to
ensure that market access and national treatment commitments would not be
suppliers,
undermined by anticompetitive behaviour by monopolies or dominant
2 38
which are particularly prevalent in the telecommunications sector.

Under this reasoning, trade disciplines could be used in cases of
anticompetitive conduct where there are violations of market access and
national treatment commitments. This understanding of trade discipline applies
to a critical area of antitrust-how best to address anticompetitive behavior by
dominant firms. It is particularly relevant for regulated industries, where
antitrust may have overlapping jurisdiction with sector regulators. In such
situations, a dominant firm in a regulated industry may distort the competitive
process through monopolization. Domestic antitrust solutions may be
inadequate because of various antitrust immunities and limitations in domestic
capabilities and laws. 239 Trade law may provide a second avenue of action
against such behavior that antitrust may not adequately address or remedy.

235 .

See, e.g., World Trade Organization, supra note 131; Mexico-Measures Affecting

Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (2004); United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,

WT/DS136/AB/R & WT/DS162/AB/R (2000); Canada-MeasuresRelating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, AB-2004-3 (2004).
236. Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, supra note 235
237. Through the RP, the WTO addresses a number of key telecommunications regulatory issues,
such as interconnection, universal service, and resource allocation.
238. Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, supra note 235, at para. 7.237.
239. Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359 (2003).
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The ability to decide cases that implicate antitrust does not ensure that the
WTO would decide them correctly or use economic analysis that a domestic
antitrust adjudicator would apply. To be an adequate institutional response, and
more effective than other institutional alternatives, WTO actions must have
competency in adjudicating such cases. How the institutional choice of
adjudication in antitrust-like trade disputes plays out illustrates the abilities and
limitations of this institutional choice. The first question is whether WTO
adjudication can understand antitrust through the trade lens. One former WTO
Appellate Body member notes that a background in antitrust is essential for
proper adjudication with respect to WTO RP obligations:
Without a common understanding of the goals and methods of competition law, it is
difficult to see how WTO Members to begin with, and WTO dispute settlers later
on, can interpret some of the specific commitments on the prevention of
anticompetitive practices.... It will also be difficult to adjudicate disputes in WTO
240
about the correct interpretation of these critical, but generally worded principles.

This is not to suggest that a WTO RP challenge is analogous to antitrust
law. The WTO uses trade remedies rather than antitrust remedies. Nevertheless,
effective RP dispute settlement must take into account competition and antitrust
law to inform its application of trade law in areas that implicate competition.
Because of the complexity of issues involved in market access questions,

analysis requires a fact-specific inquiry. Monopolization cases are complex by
nature. Any attempt to use trade law remedies to address market access
restraints requires highly nuanced thinking. Where barriers to entry constrain
market competition, especially when these barriers result from government
restraints favoring a dominant firm, the presumption that the market allows
entry and exit requires reconsideration. Where government restraints allow
firms (including dominant firms) to erect entry barriers, one cannot then argue
that international competition can deter the exercise of monopoly power.
Adjudicators may lack the capacity to undertake rigorous analysis of such
complex interplays. Indeed, Hovenkamp cautions:
When a particular form of behavior is too complex for reliable analysis within a
reasonable time, then the only defensible antitrust rule is to let the market-rather
than state intervention--control that behavior, at least for the time being .... But
the basic rule should be nonintervention unless the tribunal has a high degree of
confidence that it has identified anticompetitive conduct and can apply an effective
remedy.241

If WTO adjudicators lack the ability to undertake such an inquiry and
properly identify the anticompetitive conduct, they may do more harm than
good, globally, by imposing as penalties for perceived market access problems
240. Trade and Competition Interlinkages: The Case of Telecom, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei,
Venice, 15 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/FE756606-2F38-4279-8F9A3BC 1FBOF9DAB/303/6899.pdf.
241. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-ChicagoAntitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 257, 272 (2001).
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trade remedies that may in fact have no sound economic rationale.
If RP based dispute resolution is a bridgehead between trade and antitrust
law, current dispute settlement demonstrates that the gap in understanding of
market access concerns between trade and antitrust at the WTO remains
significant. The antitrust elements of the Telmex case present problematic
reasoning. 242 In finding for the United States, the panel addressed the case with
only formalistic and procedural reasoning; it did not provide a detailed decision
that appropriately wrestled with the complex economics based factual record.
Neven and Mavroides provide an important critique of the decision's antitrust
elements on these grounds. 243 In short, the decision lacked a sophisticated
analysis to determine the relevant market. What analysis the panel did bring to
bear on the relevant market question was deficient in two critical ways. First,
the panel merely accepted that the market for termination services was the
relevant market, even though there were other possible ways to define the
relevant market. 244 Second, the panel pursued a theory of exploitative practice
by the Mexican telecommunications industry, which is difficult to prove in an
antitrust context, given possible procompetitive justifications. Additionally, the
245
panel read into the RP a cartelization provision that did not exist.
For greater impact in the antitrust world, Telmex would have needed an
antitrust inquiry in addition to its trade law analysis. Overlaps in the two fields
were likely present in the underlying facts of the Telmex case, and better
adjudication could have applied these two disciplinary tools together. Generally
speaking, if the WTO were to employ complex antitrust analysis it would better
serve as an effective institution to address market access issues. However, the
Telmex case suggests that the WTO is not yet an effective institutional choice
for remedying market access problems. The gap between trade and antitrust
remains too great in the WTO as it currently functions.
ii. Central Merger Authority
One antitrust function that the WTO could theoretically take on is that of a
central merger authority to reduce international coordination and substantive
differences to merger review.246 In this role it would operate as an international
242. J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Uberregulation Without Economics: The World Trade
Organization's Decision in the U.S.-Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, 57 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (2004); Petros C. Mavroidis & Damien Neven, El Mess in TELMEX: A Comment on
Mexico-Measures Affecting TelecommunicationsServices, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 271 (2006).
243. Mavroidis & Neven, supra note 242, at Part IV.

244. Id. at para. 365.
245. Id. at Part V; Philip Marsden, Trade and Competition: WTO Decides First Competition
Case-With DisappointingResults, COMP. L. INSIGHT, May 2004, at 3.

246. To be sure, this proposal goes farther than even the WTO Trade and Competition Working
Group would advocate. A more limited proposal by the Chair of the Working Group advocated that the
WTO push for increased convergence among merger control systems. Moreover, the proposal
recommended an economic rather than political rationale for improvements to international merger
control. Ariel Ezrachi, Merger Control and Cross Border Transactions: A Pragmatic View on
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regulator with the power of merger review across jurisdictions. As more
countries develop merger control, the number of countries involved and the
overlap and conflict in their requirements ultimately may require an
international solution. In an increasingly global world, a global merger control
system might create efficiencies in the merger review process. Disparate
policies are currently in place, in both procedural and substantive areas of
merger control. 248 As more countries enact merger control regimes,
coordination problems among agencies may increase.
The growing global reach and increasing concentration of ever more
markets may justify a centralized regulator for merger control. 249 Such a system
is not without precedent. The EU merger control system allows for
supranational review of mergers that reach certain community-wide thresholds.
A global antitrust merger system simply takes supranational merger control to
its logical conclusion. After all, many industries are already global and
populated with players ripe to merge with, acquire, or be acquired by each
other.
Distortions in a centralized merger system depend on the distribution of
winners and losers in countries subject to merger jurisdiction but under
25
authority of a centralized agency. The possibility of such distortion leads to
an institutional dilemma. Under centralized merger control, the costs of
domestic-level public choice problems could magnify at the international level.
This may so increase the cost of participation in the merger control system that
only well funded parties could afford to participate. These may be the very
participants that have the most to gain from increasingly concentrated global
markets. However, such concern may be overblown. Drawing upon the lessons
of the EU merger system, some theoretical work suggests that the allocation of
merger jurisdiction, whether to a national25 1or supranational regulator has only a
small effect on the outcome of a merger.
The benefits of a centralized merger control system remain hypothetical. It
seems unlikely that in the near term such a centralized system will
materialize. 252 Countries generally may be unwilling to put global interests
Cooperation, Convergence and What's in Between, in TRANSATLANTIC

ANTITRUST RESEARCH

HANDBOOK (Philip Marsden ed., forthcoming 2006).
247. Fiebig, supra note 1.
248. KY P. EWING, COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM AMERICA'S
ANTITRUST EXPERIENCE 36-38 (2003).

249. Oliver Budzinski, Towards an International Governance of Transborder Mergers?Competition Networks and Institutions between Centralism and Decentralism,36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1, 4 (2003); Mitsuo Matsushita, Reflections on Competition Policy/Law in the Framework of the
WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY, FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 34-38

(Barry Hawk ed., 1997). For a contrarian view, see Christopher Bliss, Trade and Competition Control?,
in I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONISATION 316 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds., 1996).
250. Neven & R611er, supra note 1.
251. Id.
252. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H. Angstreich, MultilateralMerger Review: Lessons from Our
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above national interests. 253 The current major participants in international
merger regulation would likely question the feasibility of any central merger
authority that could limit their own regulatory efforts. Institution of a central
authority would require the largest players in merger control, the United States
and European Union, to cede their direct control over mergers to a worldwide
body in which they would have less ability to control results and may have less
trust in the ability to limit errors in merger control. Even the EU has not
eliminated national review of certain mergers. 254 Establishing a centralized
merger control authority would require stakeholder nations to reach consensus
on global substantive standards for merger review-standards that create fewer
costs than benefits. Whether nations can achieve such consensus or standards is
uncertain. One significant roadblock is that some substantive differences
remain between U.S. and EU approaches to merger review. 255 Additionally,
development of a global welfare standard may simply be beyond current
capabilities.256
Countries' differences in approaches (and political objections to others'
approaches) make the common ground necessary for a global, centralized
merger authority elusive. Differences and objections aside, global welfare
merger analysis seems to be outside the competency of the WTO. The WTO
seems incapable as it stands to oversee global, merger regulation given the cost
of change and the availability of other institutions that are better equipped to
handle such a role. For the most part it is an adjudicative body that enforces
binding commitments that parties have entered into in order to reduce trade
barriers. The WTO staff lacks even everyday knowledge of antitrust issues,
limiting the organization's capacity to serve as an antitrust regulator or central
administrator. The WTO's role is to reduce public rather than private restraints
of trade. Much of merger coordination and substantive merger antitrust
problems involve private conduct rather than government-imposed barriers.
Even when there are public or mixed public and private restraints to257mergers,
governments often circumvent antitrust agencies to impose restraints.

Federalism,68 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 225 (2000).
253. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
877, 916 (2003).
254. Instead, it has moved to increased decentralization under Regulation 1/2003 except in cases
that have a EU dimension to them.
255. William Kolasky, GE-Honeywell-Narrowing But Not Closing the Gap, 20 ANTITRUST 69
(2006); Eleanor M. Fox, The European Court's Judgment in GE/Honeywell-Not a Poster Childfor
Comity or Convergence, 20 ANTITRUST 77 (2006); Lorenzo Coppi & Mike Walker, Substantial
Convergence or ParallelPaths? Similarities and Differences in the Economic Analysis of Horizontal
Mergers in U.S. and EU Competition Law, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 101 (2004).

256. Paul Crampton & Milos Barutciski, Trade DistortingPrivate Restraints:A PracticalAgenda
for FutureAction, 6 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 3, 47 (1999).
257. Simon Evenett, Trouble in Paradise: Will Technocrats Review Global Mergers Forever,
CESIFO FORUM, Spring 2006, at 27.
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iii. Norm-creator for Mergers and Cartels
One role that the WTO could play is facilitator of antitrust norms. Such a
role returns to the vision of the 2003 WTO, when it ended the discussions of
the Working Group on the interaction of trade and competition. The WTO
discussions on "core principles" attempted to apply WTO principles of
transparency and nondiscrimination to the development of antitrust norms. 258 A
global norm-diffusion function for the WTO presupposes antitrust agencies'
interest in embracing it as yet another forum in which to discuss best practices.
Given the limited time and financial resources of antitrust agencies, particularly
those of the developing world, it is not clear that the WTO offers a forum
uniquely suited to create antitrust norms for which agencies should spend their
limited time and resources in meetings and negotiations. Use of the WTO to
create antitrust norms seems inappropriate given the institutional weakness of
the WTO in antitrust, especially in light of the relative strength of other
international institutions such as the ICN (discussed infra). Other international
institutions have already established success in disseminating antitrust norms,
in some cases norms implicating private conduct such as mergers and cartels,
and have tackled mixed private-government restraints in studies on sector
regulation. The WTO addresses only government limitations on trade and
antitrust. WTO agreements do not reach purely private behavior, even when
there are international effects of this behavior. These limitations on WTO
agreements limit its ability to create norms in antitrust for private
anticompetitive behavior.
With respect to cartels, the WTO simply lacks the capacity to police purely
private behavior. Many international cartels operate without any government
restraints upon them. The WTO can only be effective in those cases in which
the government is somehow facilitating a private cartel though regulation or
purposeful nonenforcement of anticartel laws. The WTO's possible remedies
also limit its effectiveness in combating international cartels. The WTO remedy
is simply an order "to cease and desist." Lack of damages declaws much of
WTO remedies' deterrent value. 2 59 As the discussion on cartel remedies in Part
IlI.A illustrates, even treble civil damages may not deter cartels. There is little
reason to believe that a system without a multiplier effect would create an
incentive for companies to cease in their cartel activities. 260
The WTO could serve as a talking shop to create norms on cartels. Given
the other institutional alternatives, a WTO solution may not lead to the optimal

258. Communication from the EC and Its Member States: A WTO Competition Agreement and
Development (2003), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/april/tradoci 11126 i.pdf.
259. Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,
II EUR. L.J. 763 (2000).
260. Connor, supra note 21.
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institutional outcome for fighting cartels. 261 As with WTO treatment of
mergers, creation of yet another forum to discuss cartel enforcement and best
practices entails costs but not benefits greater than the costs of negotiating such
an agreement and using such a forum. Certain institutional alternatives,
described later in this Part, appear more viable.
2. PreferentialTrade Agreements

a. The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements
The WTO is not the only binding set of international trade agreements with
antitrust implications. Countries have been entering into increasing numbers of
PTAs. Some of the older and more of the newer PTAs include antitrust
chapters. As of January 2005, 170 PTAs have been notified to the WTO and are
currently in force, and 65 are estimated to be operational though not yet
notified. 262 Over 130 of the notified agreements have been entered since
January 1995.
There are both offensive and defensive reasons for PTA liberalization.
Liberalization may lead to increased multilateral liberalization across the global
board. The dynamics of PTAs create bargaining leverage for PTA member
countries in multilateral negotiations. Parties to a PTA have incentives to push
for global agreements to concessions that they already have made bilaterally. In
short, as Country A liberalizes its markets with respect to Country B, Country
A has an added incentive to have Countries X and Z make similar
commitments globally, since Country A has already liberalized its own market.
PTAs also play to a country's defensive interests. If Country A has an
agreement with Country B, Country C might feel at a disadvantage in its trade
to Country A vis-A-vis Country B, because Country C lacks the preferential
treatment in trade with Country A that Country B enjoys. Country C may
therefore try to push for such commitments in its own PTA with Country A in
order to gain the same trade advantages that Country B has with Country A.
b. Can Trade Agreements Make a Difference at the Regional or Bilateral
Level?
A recent OECD paper provides the first examination of antitrust chapters
across a number of recent PTAs. The OECD study provides a dataset of PTA
commitments. The paper creates a taxonomy of antitrust provisions based on
261. It is interesting that the OECD Trade and Competition Group document summarizing the
salient issues in the trade and competition debate does not present a case for why anticartel efforts
should find a home in a WTO competition policy as opposed to a combination of soft law and domestic
institutions. See OECD, TRADE AND COMPETITION: FROM DOHA TO CANCUN (2003).

262. See generally Jo-Ann Crawford & Robert Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional
Trade Agreements (WTO Discussion Paper No. 8, 2005).
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eight classifications. It classifies agreements across 24 different types of
provisions. 263
This taxonomy reflects the complexity of agreements and their
264
provisions.

A breakdown of the antitrust trade provision taxonomy provides an
assessment of most-used provisions. Two thirds or more of the agreements
include provisions relating to (1) cooperation, including exchanges of evidence
and/or information; (2) anticompetitive behavior, including anticompetitive
agreements (such as cartel clauses), abuse of dominant positions, and state
enterprises / state monopolies; (3) nondiscrimination; (4) transparency; and (5)
consultation mechanisms. The inclusion of such provisions suggests that most
agreements focus on both procedural and substantive improvements relating to
trade and antitrust. Procedurally, this suggests a need to formalize increased
agency-level cooperation. Anticartel clauses suggest that PTAs may combat
cartels' international effects. Some of these provisions also implicate market
access issues in the trade and antitrust interface.
Lack of anticartel provisions (inclusion in fewer than one third of other
antitrust PTAs) suggests that such provisions are not priorities in the
international trade and antitrust interface-and/or that the political cost for
inclusion of these provisions is too high. Cooperation-based provisions include
notification as well as negative and positive comity. Among anticompetitive
behavior provisions, only merger provisions are rarely included. Other
provisions, rare within PTA antitrust chapters, include provisions for due
process or dispute settlement.
The rarity of either negative or positive comity provisions in PTAs suggests
that the signatories at the time of signing lacked either the sufficient level of
trust or common norms that would allow inclusion of such commitments. The
lack of notification requirements for the other parties likewise suggests that
trust and cooperation between agencies require organic growth rather than a
mandate from above. PTA effectiveness for increased cooperation may be
limited to overcoming problems of domestic law that would otherwise make
cooperation impossible, such as limits to exchanges of information. A low
number of provisions on information sharing weakens the ability of agencies to
coordinate on merger or cartel enforcement. In most cases, PTAs limit
remedies for violations to consultations or have no remedies whatsoever for
violations under the PTA.
A lack of provisions regarding merger control signals that nations may not
263. OECD, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements Part I, COMIDAF/TD 3
(2005). These categories also may lead to errors based on misclassification or of double counting. See
Simon J. Evenett, What Can We Really Learn from the Competition Provisions of RTAs, in
COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT GAINS
39-40 (Lucian Cemat, Philippe Brusick & Ana Maria Alvarez eds., 2005).
264. OECD, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements Part I, COMIDAF/TD 8

(2005).
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view the PTA as an appropriate institution to overcome the malfunctions of
their antitrust agencies' merger policies, and that agencies already may be
effective in their merger control. Lack of merger control-related provisions may
indicate that the operational coordination needed for merger regime requires
alternative institutions that are more responsive and flexible to these more
episodic concerns. The substantive issues included in PTAs have an effect on
merger control only to the extent that there are consultations or dispute
settlement between the two countries' agencies. Issues of substantive law in
PTAs, such as monopolization or cartels, do not apply binding dispute
settlement. Instead, these provisions preserve domestic agency autonomy
through consultations. Substantive commitments in trade agreements by
agencies may serve to institutionalize objectives but make most of provisions in
PTAs aspirational only.
That PTAs do not usually include dispute settlement begs the question of
what role PTAs serve at all for antitrust compliance. Surprisingly, given that
the United States has been hostile to the inclusion of binding antitrust
provisions within the WTO, all U.S. PTAs contain binding dispute resolution
for "Designated Monopolies" and "State Enterprises." Though they are not
"pure" antitrust issues, these two areas provide trade remedies for violations of
nondiscrimination by parties to the PTAs. Viewed positively, even the United
States, hostile to binding WTO antitrust remedies, has committed itself to
dispute settlement for some antitrust issues. From the normative standpoint, this
type of PTA provision provides a model for other PTAs, and ultimately the
WTO itself, for trade and antitrust issues such as market access. Since there has
never been a completed dispute settlement based on these provisions, it remains
unclear if panelists to such disputes will be able to apply trade remedies with an
understanding of antitrust harm. It is possible that the judicial malfunction of
WTO dispute settlement may replicate in PTA dispute settlement.
Regional PTAs have both political and economic components.
Economically, they create a common market and harmonize domestic rules.
Political issues play a role in economic integration in these regional and
265
subregional PTAs. Because of the political context, these PTAs go beyond
merely trade-related issues. Though the EU is the best known regional PTA, it
is not the only one. More recent attempts at political and economic integration,
such as the Andean Community, Mercosur, and CARICOM, have been less
266
This is due to a lack of political will to
successful in the antitrust arena.
265. On the EU, see THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Peter Stirk &
David Weigall eds., 1999); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES
HAVE AN EMPEROR?" (1998). On Mercosur see, for example, Monica Hirst, Mercosur's Complex
Political Agenda, in MERCOSUR: REGIONAL INTEGRATION, WORLD MARKETS 35 (Riordan Roett ed.,

1999).
266. D. Daniel Sokol, Why is this ChapterDifferent From All the Others? An Examination of Why
Countries Enter Into Non-enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements Versus

HeinOnline -- 4 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 95 2007

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 4.1, 2007

increase supranational antitrust and, in Mercosur and the Andean Community,
limits in institutional design. CARICOM's capacity constraints have limited
subregional political and economic integration.
The EU offers some guidance in establishing such PTAs. As part of EU
Antitrust Modernization, Regulation 1/2003 effectively granted full
enforcement powers over Articles 81 and 82 to the Member States, subject to
some powers retained by the EC to assure uniformity of application, and
allowed their agencies to share information with one another. The following
hypothetical illustrates the process of regional coordination. Let us assume that
the Italian and German antitrust authorities become aware of the
anticompetitive effects on consumers in their countries due to conduct taking
place in France. They would use the European Competition Network to contact
the French antitrust agency, provide it with the information they have, and have
the French take over investigation and enforcement. This type of
interjurisdictional regional work occurs with increasing regularity within the
EU.
Regionalization through PTAs may solve the problem of international
antitrust for small economies that lack the resources to fund an antitrust agency.
Under such an agreement, a single regional agency could remedy antitrust
violations in a given country. PTAs may also be appropriate where effects of
competition are region-wide. On its own, a nation's antitrust agency may not be
able to act on conduct that is anticompetitive conduct at the regional level.
PTAs may thus prove effective in the Caribbean and parts of Africa, where the
size of a country and its economy may make creating an antitrust agency
unfeasible.
c. Participation in Antitrust Regional Trade Agreements
Participation in antitrust PTAs tracks participation in the WTO to the extent
that dispute resolution is possible in such PTAs. High-stakes domestic
participants forge public-private partnerships with trade officials to identify and
bring forth cases for dispute settlement. In those agreements, such as NAFTA,
which allow private rights of action, private parties may bypass government
actors to participate directly in adjudication. The nature of participation within
PTAs shifts when recourse comes in the form of consultations between parties
to the agreement. In these cases, domestic agencies, rather than adjudication,
become the institutional driver of participation. Domestic stakeholders may
petition agencies formally or informally to take certain policy positions. In
those agreements with no dispute-resolution mechanisms, lack of recourse to
any solution under the PTA limits participation.

Other Alternatives, CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
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B. Soft Law Antitrust Institutions
International soft law networks allow domestic agencies to share
information. This may facilitate cooperation and make compliance more likely.
Participation in such networks is important because soft law convergence sets
the agenda for regulatory thinking and prioritization. Soft law promotes
convergence upon general benchmarked principles, which, because they
mandate no single standard, a country may more easily apply to meet its
specific needs. This allows agencies the flexibility to adapt best practices to the
socioeconomic situation in their given country. Soft law preserves more
sovereignty than hard law when addressing international antitrust problems.
Soft law maximizes the possibility of implementation and reduces potential
roadblocks to reform through flexible responses. Unlike hard law, soft law
creates benchmarks for behavior rather than exact standards. When there are
minimum standards, these operate as a default rule. Countries
can experiment
26 7
as to particular types of enforcement actions and methods.
Though the tools that each of the soft law institutions use to create its work
product are similar, as are the malfunctions of each of the soft law institutions,
the comparative institutional analysis of soft law institutions illustrates why the
ICN is the most effective soft law institution to address general issues within
international antitrust. The ICN works better than other soft law and hard law
international institutions, domestic institutions, and the market, because its
institutional structure encourages meaningful participation across a number of
levels.
1. The Organizationfor Economic Co-operationand Development
a. Functions of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
The OECD CLPC is a transgovernmental network of antitrust enforcers. It
employs several tools that facilitate informal convergence through the sharing
of experiences across agencies: peer reviews, identification of best practices,
and the creation of voluntary recommendations. 268 Discussions of these issues
create opportunities for agencies to understand international antitrust in a
comparative context.
Members of the OECD prepare discussion papers that set out their
approaches to the issues under review. Meetings facilitate personal interaction
across jurisdictions. This assists agency coordination on cross-border issues.
Meetings also create opportunities for agency leadership to perform critical
267. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of US Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003).
268. Terry Winslow, The OECD's Global Forum on Competition and Other Activities, 16 FALL

ANTITRUST 38 (2001).
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self-assessment in a friendly setting. Among member antitrust agencies,
OECD-led discussions promote meeting of the minds on antitrust matters and
cross-pollination of approaches to particular issues. This process leads to the
development of best practices, which become formalized as nonbinding OECD
recommendations.
Discussions expose agencies to alternative modes of problem-solving. This
deliberative process allows agencies to benchmark their experiences and
develop common standards. Peer review is essential to this process. The OECD
conducts peer reviews of participant countries' antitrust systems. 269 The peer
review contains recommendations to improve the reviewed nation's antitrust
regime.
The purpose of peer review is to examine a country's antitrust system, the
better to improve policy making and adopt best practices. Insulation makes
organizations less receptive to feedback. The OECD peer review challenges
agency insulation by bringing forth criticism of an agency's policy and
enforcement choices. OECD peer reviews of a country's antitrust agency
performance provide an outside assessment of that agency. In a peer review, the
OECD staff prepares a lengthy report that articulates the strengths and
weaknesses of a particular competition agency.
The OECD presents its peer reviews in a forum before other OECD
members. Agencies have the opportunity to comment on the approaches,
strengths, and weaknesses of their sister agencies. This OECD process
implicates the regulatory principal-agent problem. Agency interests may be
different from those of their home countries. 20 Peer review may overcome
some of the principal-agent accountability limitations in regulatory fields, such
as antitrust. 271 Peer review creates a mechanism in which the agent (the
antitrust agency) must justify its use of discretion given the experiences of its
peer agencies. This272makes an agent accountable not merely to its principal but
also to other peers.
Peer reviews serve two functions. First, they police countries' compliance
with benchmarked norms. Because of the repeat interaction of these agency
heads, agencies have an incentive not to be shamed in front of peer agencies for
poor enforcement decisions and outcomes. Second, agencies use peer review as
269. Fabrizio Pagani, PeerReview: A Tool For Co-operationand Change, OECD SG/LEG (2002),

at 1.
270.

See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information

Agencies, and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003).

271. Much recent applied work in the area comes in the study of "new governance." See, for
example, the special issue of the European Law Journal(Vol. 8, 2002) devoted to new governance. For
US perspectives, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
272. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without
Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE 1N THE EU AND THE US 395 (Joanne Scott & Grainne de

Burca eds., 2006).
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a tool for domestic consumption. OECD peer reviews give agencies a mandate
to push for domestic change. A reviewed agency can return to its legislature
with an OECD mandate to revise the structure of domestic antitrust system.
b. Dynamics of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development's Institutional Structure
There is some intergovemmental structure rather than pure agency-toagency deliberation within the CLPC. OECD members are countries rather than
agencies. This makes it more difficult to accomplish some antitrust objectives.
Many government agencies must vet all recommendations before the CLPC
sends them to the OECD Council. Such agencies can include trade ministries,
finance ministries, and foreign ministries. Each may have objectives different
from those of antitrust agencies. 273 Every member country has the power to
veto, and these other agencies may push their government to veto discussion of
certain topics contrary to their particular interests, even if the veto is
counterproductive and contrary to OECD objectives.
The OECD Secretariat has a permanent staff that provides institutional
memory and capacity for in-depth analysis. For meetings on antitrust, the
secretariat staff prepares background papers of depth and quality. The OECD
Secretariat's background papers contribute significantly to the OECD's
capacity to serve as an arena for high-level, substantive antitrust discussions.
Furthermore, since members of the CLPC are all at a similar level of economic
development, agency capacity, and experience, the typical OECD meeting has
more potential for a substantial conversation on antitrust issues than the typical
meeting of the ICN or UNCTAD.
However, it is difficult for bureaucratic organizations with a permanent
staff structure to manage change effectively. Over time, such organizations tend
toward inertia and limited results. 274 The OECD is no exception to this general
trend. In certain respects, by the mid-1990s, the OECD had lost its leadership
role in setting the antitrust agenda in certain areas. The OECD launched the
Joint Group only after the WTO created a group on the interaction of trade and
antitrust. Similarly, the formation of the ICN pushed the OECD to respond and
increase its outreach efforts to nonmember countries.

273. For example, nonantitrust agencies such as trade agencies may push for cartels in some
countries for political reasons. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 176
(2001) for the case of aluminum in the United States during the 1990s.
274.
Charles Heckscher, Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 14 (Charles Heckscher & Anne
Donellon eds., 1994); MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN & CHARLES A. O'REILLY Il, WINNING THROUGH
INNOVATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND RENEWAL (2002);
ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL
REMAKING OF ECONOMICS (2006).
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c. Participation in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
The OECD is a smaller organization than the WTO or UNCTAD. Even
though some non-OECD members are observers in the CLPC, the perception is
that the OECD serves the interests of its own member countries. 27 The CLPC
shuts out many of the world's antitrust agencies, including those of the
developing world, from participation in its process of soft law harmonization
through creation of best practices. This exclusivity may be a form of regulatory
imperialism76 in which OECD countries impose their framework on developing
2
countries.

In recent years, the OECD has taken steps to increase its outreach to nonOECD members and increase its number of participants. The OECD runs a
yearly Global Competition Forum, in which agencies from the developing and
developed world discuss issues, create analytical convergence, and work to
improve cooperation across agencies. Additionally, the OECD has set up
regional antitrust centers in Eastern Europe (Hungary) and Asia (South Korea).
These centers offer assistance in capacity building and policy advice for their
respective regions. The OECD has not yet established such a center in Latin
America, but it hosts an annual Latin American Competition Forum to
encourage cooperation, coordination, mutual learning, and peer reviews for
agencies in the region. The Latin American Competition Forum allows regional
agencies to present case studies and get feedback on practices and techniques
from agencies primarily at similar levels of expertise and development.
The OECD is not a pure transgovernmental organization. The OECD has a
private sector participation component, and from time to time it invites
academics and consumer groups to participate as discussants at OECD
meetings. The Business & Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) sends a
representative of the business community to OECD meetings. This model of
private sector participation has significant weaknesses. It assumes that the
private sector speaks with a single voice for antitrust issues. BIAC must take
lowest common denominator positions on behalf of various business groups.
.The costs of participation are lower for large finns vis-A-vis individual
consumers. Other than the agencies themselves, nobody claims to speak for
individual consumers at the CLPC.
Limited involvement by nonstate actors at the OECD means that the OECD
lacks meaningful input by practitioners, NGOs, academics, and MNCs who are
repeat players in antitrust debates domestically. These stakeholders could make

275.

Edward M. Graham, "Internationalizing"Competition Policy: An Assessment of the Two

Main Alternatives, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 947, 950 (2003).

276. A more benign view is that developing-world agencies model themselves on the United States
and the EU antitrust agencies. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION

215-16 (2000).
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significant and substantial contributions with respect to enforcement priorities
and analytic approaches. Lack of nonstate participation reduces overall
participation in the OECD. Moreover, additional participatory and
accountability problems face the OECD. Its submissions and reports are subject
to confidentiality protocols. Some reports do not appear in the public record for
some time. This lack of transparency limits stakeholders' awareness of OECD
actions and limits their ability to shape the OECD agenda and limits norm
diffusion outside of agencies to the larger domestic antitrust community.
d. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Ability to
Solve Problems
The OECD is weak relative to the ICN in its ability to serve as an
implementing organization at the operational level. This limits the benefits of
OECD participation. The OECD operates by consensus. Consensus depends on
the slowest mover to certain issues. The OECD can affirm and progress
incrementally toward certain points of view already acceptable to business and
government. The OECD is not issue-driven. Instead, the OECD is deliberative.
It promotes more in-depth analysis of issues. The CLPC's function is
information-gathering and conceptualization. This allows the OECD to address
some difficult political issues at the center of the antitrust.
As OECD members are those most active in cartel and merger enforcement,
the OECD can help incrementally to set the agenda in these areas. The OECD
has helped shape the discussion of how to conceptualize improvements in
merger control since the mid-1990s. In its study of international mergers of
1994, the CLPC developed a qualitative, multiple case study approach to
277
The lengthy study included
understand the international merger process.
seven recommendations to improve harmonization and cooperation in merger
control. Additionally, in 1999 the CLPC produced the Report on Notification of
Transnational Mergers, which laid out practices and procedures to create a
better functioning merger control system. This report provided the significant
intellectual underpinning of the ICN's work to streamline its merger review
278
process.
More recently, the OECD adopted recommended merger practices that
build upon the ICN's work in merger control from 2001 to 2004. 279 These
OECD outputs on mergers, plus additional related work products that touch
upon mergers, such as increased cooperation and peer reviews, demonstrate
that the OECD plays an important role in the conceptualization of merger best
practices. But, lack of broad implementation of these best practices suggests
limitations to the OECD's ability to get countries to adopt them.
277. OECD, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD, A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL CASES (1994).
278. OECD, Report on Notification ofTransnationalMergers, DAFFE/CLP(99)2/FINAL (1999).
279. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, C(2005)34, Mar. 23, 2005.
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The OECD also has contributed to taking stock of existing anticartel
practices and developing a shared conceptualization of cartels. 280 It helped to
create a common understanding for enforcers of the problems posed by
international hard-core cartels. 281 However, this took quite a bit of time, as the
CLPC began its efforts in the 1960s, while the OECD recommendation on
hard-core cartels did not emerge till 1998. In 2005 the OECD followed up this
work with the creation of best practices for cooperation among agencies in
cartel investigations. Like the 2005 recommended practices for mergers,
parallel work on the same issue at the ICN has influenced best practices for
fighting cartels.282

Increased cooperation has facilitated better formal and informal cooperation
on cartel work among OECD members. As a result of increased cooperation,
the OECD has assisted in strengthening ties between agencies on cartel matters.
Bilateral ties improve trust between agencies. They make it easier for agencies
to cooperate on cartel investigations that have an international dimension. The
OECD also has helped set the agenda for more formal bilateral ties between
agencies. After the OECD developed a model bilateral cooperation agreement,
many of the subsequent bilateral agreements between OECD members
followed this model.28 3
Through the work of its Joint Group, the OECD has been active in refining
the conceptualization of market access. Nevertheless, despite yearly meetings
of the Joint Group, case studies, and secretariat publications, the intellectual
divide among OECD members on market access remains significant. EU
Member States and the United States have not been able to reach an intellectual
consensus on how to consider or address market access. Complicating matters,
the Joint Group's mandate has expired, its work not renewed. 284 This limits the
OECD's ability to further understanding of market access and create
recommended practices on market access issues.
2. The UnitedNations Conference on Trade and Development

a. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Explained
In many ways, the UNCTAD is the mirror image of the OECD, except that
it pushes a developing-world agenda rather than a developed-world agenda.
280. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core
Cartels,C(98)35/FINAL, Mar. 25, 1998; OECD, Recommendation ConcerningEffective Action Against
HardCore Cartels,C(98)35/FINAL (2005).
281. OECD, supra note 25, at 8.
282. OECD, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 24.
283. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation between Member
Countries on Anticompetitive Practicesaffecting InternationalTrade, C(95)130/FtNAL (July 27, 1995).
284. BNA, OECD Acknowledges Low Priority, Dumps Antitrust-Trade Working Group,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REPORT, June 16, 2006, at 695.
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Thus, as a transgovemmental institution, the UNCTAD shares many of the
OECD's outputs, strengths, and weaknesses (discussed in the previous
Section). Additionally, the UNCTAD has more of an international trade focus.
Much of the antitrust work within the UNCTAD reflects this overall trade
focus. This makes the UNCTAD well versed in many of the international trade
and antitrust interface issues, including market access.
Many of the early UNCTAD antitrust positions reflected developing-world
preferences in an era of import substitution and state command and control.
Within antitrust policy, early UNCTAD work culminated in the UCTAD code
of 1980, as discussed in Part II, supra. Even though neoliberalism transformed
the thinking of many UNCTAD members during the 1980s and 1990s, the
UNCTAD remains focused on developing-world antitrust in a way that pursues
the sometimes disparate goals of fair trade, industrial policy, economic
equality, and efficiency.
The UNCTAD organizes conferences to bring together agencies and
identify issues to study, and it also publishes academic investigations into
antitrust issues. 285 It has created a template for a model antitrust law that has
been used in the creation antitrust regimes for a number of countries. Moreover,
the UNCTAD has also examined work in international cooperation and cartels.
The UNCTAD provides technical assistance to countries for the set up and
implementation of antitrust laws. The UNCTAD's ability to undertake effective
technical assistance is due in part to recipient agencies' perception of a more
sympathetic ear at the UNCTAD than they would find at the developed world's
technical assistance platforms.
b. Participation in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Developing countries set the UNCTAD agenda. This allows the UNCTAD
to recognize the unique needs of developing-world agencies and countries. The
UNCTAD pushes an understanding that countries with different levels of
development have different internal dynamics. It holds that developing-world
agencies and antitrust systems require special accommodations, given their
social, political, and economic backgrounds and their capacity constraints.
Though the UNCTAD strives to represent the interests of the developing world,
it is an intergovernmental organization subject to the same questions of
legitimacy and democracy deficit as the OECD because of its lack of direct
stakeholder participation. Like the OECD, end consumers do not have a direct
voice in 6UNCTAD deliberations. They must rely on agencies to represent their
views.

28

285. Philippe Brusick, UNCTAD's Role in Promoting Multilateral Co-operation on Competition
Law and Policy, 24 W. COMP. 23 (2001).
286. Antitrust agencies, flawed as they are, may be the most participatory in terms of how they
represent consumer interests relative to the other institutions discussed in this article. Consumers rely on
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c. Dynamics of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
The UNCTAD's institutional malfunctions are more pronounced than those
of the OECD or ICN in certain respects. The UNCTAD lacks the resources and
the full political support of the United States and the European Union in
antitrust matters. Any policy preference for norms in antitrust requires the tacit
consent of both these great powers. As merger enforcement and cartels have an
impact on developed world agencies, these agencies, and the organizations in
which they participate (i.e., the OECD and ICN), want to take the lead in these
areas. Moreover, the more powerful and influential stakeholders in mergers and
cartels (private antitrust bars in the United States and EU and MNCs) feel more
at home at the ICN and OECD than they do at the UNCTAD. This limits the
UNCTAD's ability to shape the antitrust agenda in these areas.
Even as the UNCTAD may offer greater legitimacy in representing the
perceived needs of developing-world countries, it is for this very reason that the
UNCTAD is less effective as a participatory vehicle for international antitrust
harmonization and implementation. The UNCTAD produces least commondenominator output of all of its members. This makes for a low cost to
participation but little benefit, in the form of lowest common-denominator
work product. Unlike the OECD, not all UNCTAD members have an antitrust
regime. Nor are all UNCTAD members as similar in levels of economic
development as OECD members. Indeed, all OECD members are also
UNCTAD members, since the UNCTAD is a UN organization. This affects
who participates and how much of a voice each participant has in UNCTAD
discussions. For example, in the UNCTAD it is just as important to address the
views of Macedonia, Vietnam, or Zimbabwe on an efficiencies defense in
merger control as it is to consider German or U.S. opinions. Like other UN
organs, the UNCTAD may have more of an overt political agenda. Some
UNCTAD members would regard a Chicago School economic approach as
anathema if it came to a politically incorrect conclusion. For example,
UNCTAD work that did not support social justice concerns but only economic
efficiency might be problematic for a number of UNCTAD members.
The UNCTAD provides a forum for developing countries to air their
grievances with a sympathetic audience. The UNCTAD provides a broader
vision of antitrust, including issues of development and social justice, which
other institutions lack. The UNCTAD can build consensus of common views
among its developing-world constituent agencies as to issues of development as
they intersect with antitrust concerns. Its ability to provide technical assistance
gives the UNCTAD capacity to shape the rules and norms of a number of
developing-world antitrust systems.

antitrust agencies to protect consumer interests. Deborah Platt Majoras, Celebrating the FTC, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 755, 757 (2005).
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d. Institutional Dilemma of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
As international convergence in methods and thought in antitrust becomes
more of a reality, the UCTAD faces an institutional dilemma. 287 The
UNCTAD's role is under attack from both the ICN and OECD. Unless the
UNCTAD reinvents itself in a unique role, it may lose some of its relevance in
policy debates. The other soft law institutions have taken the lead in antitrust
harmonization, benchmarking, implementation, and policy. This is in part a
function of power asymmetries in economics and politics. As more developingworld antitrust agencies attend OECD events, the OECD can engage members
of the traditional UNCTAD constituency in OECD peer reviews, studies, and
recommendations. In contrast, the UNCTAD, because of its history of
antagonism to Chicago School antitrust, does not receive the same level of
representation of developed agency leadership at its events. UNCTAD attempts
at peer review are a recent phenomenon; it remains to be seen how effective
they are compared to OECD peer reviews.
The ICN presents a particular challenge to the UNCTAD. Like the
UNCTAD, the ICN includes both developing and developed world antitrust
agencies. Developing-world antitrust agencies attend ICN meetings and are
involved in working groups in part to show that they can participate side by
side on equal footing with their sister agencies in the developed world.
Developing-world agencies reflect their participation in the ICN in various ICN
work products, as the next Section illustrates. With limited resources,
developing-world agencies may rather spend their human and financial capital
on ICN endeavors that enhance their reputation in the eyes of more developed
antitrust agencies.
3. The InternationalCompetition Network

a. Overview of the International Competition Network
The ICN is a relatively new transnational organization in which
nongovernmental advisors participate with antitrust agencies in soft law
harmonization of antitrust. In its brief five years of existence, the ICN seems to
have moved compliance further than the longer-standing OECD and UNCTAD.
ICN annual meetings regularly receive delegates from over 70 countries with
antitrust laws. Among the issues discussed at the ICN are guidelines for merger
and cartel enforcement, capacity building, the relationship of regulated sector
enforcement to antitrust, and competition advocacy. Market access (and indeed
the trade and antitrust interface) has never been a part of the ICN agenda.
287. To the extent that we witness convergence, it seems to follow a more economics-based,
efficiency approach.
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b. The International Competition Network as a Transnational Institution
There are both realist and constructivist elements to explain the ICN. From
the realist perspective, the ICN facilitates agency coordination. As agencies
around the world began to exercise merger control powers, the business
community and U.S. and EU agencies pushed for increased coordination across
agencies because of the increased transaction costs for mergers. To a lesser
extent, these same forces have pushed for cartel coordination.288 The ICN
provides agency heads and their senior staff an opportunity to have face-to-face
contact with each other. This process establishes personal relationships, which
enhance coordination across agencies. Setting up basic norms allows for
common understandings. In this sense, the ICN has constructivist elements.
The purpose and output of the ICN is to transform behavior of various actors to
common antitrust norms. As a transnational organization, the stakes are low.
There is no rulemaking function to the ICN. The ICN lacks dispute settlement.
ICN outputs are nonbinding.
The ICN's greatest contribution to international antitrust has been to create
and implement norms across jurisdictions, as the discussion on the work of the
ICN mergers and cartel groups explores. 289 The transnational structure of the
ICN plays a role in its success. The ICN's institutional structure and topic
choices also help to explain these successes. Transnationalism in the antitrust
setting has many of the benefits of transgovernmentalism, without the ultimate
country-level political check found in transgovernmental organizations. Unlike
the OECD, ICN positions do not need vetting before other national nonantitrust
agencies or government ministries. This has consequences for which parties
and interests in the ICN shape debates and what sort of outputs are possible.
c. Participation in the International Competition Network
At the agency level, the ICN provides an opportunity for young agencies to
participate in norm creation with more established agencies. Developing-world
agencies head a number of the ICN groups, e.g., Competition Policy
Implementation (Brazil); subgroups, e.g., Antitrust and the Judiciary (Brazil
and Chile), Technical Assistance (Estonia), and Cartels Implementation
(Brazil). At one point a developing-world agency (Mexico) headed the ICN
itself. Nevertheless, the ICN retains structural obstacles to developing countries
setting its agenda. Developing-world agencies have limitations on their ability
to set a development agenda (other than for technical assistance, which touches
few raw political nerves of developed agencies). Mitigating this concern is a
number of developing countries' membership on the ICN steering group, which
288. The business community wants increased certainty in enforcement and a reduction in disparate
outcomes in investigations and prosecutions.
289. William E. Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence in International
Competition Policy, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 309, 311 (2003).
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sets the overall ICN agenda. This reduces the power asymmetries that favor the
United States and EU, but retains enough of the power asymmetry that the
United States and EU buy in to the ICN's agenda and work products.
For some developing countries there are financial costs to participation at
ICN meetings. This limits the ability of these agencies to participate
meaningfully. To address the need for participation by developing-world
agencies, the ICN has set up a not-for-profit corporation to support ICN
activities. To reduce it potential for capture, the corporation only accepts funds
from member governments and agencies. The corporation supports delegations
from financially challenged agencies to the annual ICN conferences.
Participation at the ICN includes more than agencies of different levels of
experience and capacity. Because the ICN is a transnational organization,
participation by nongovernmental actors plays an important role. The
mechanisms of participation and types of participants in the ICN help to shape
its functions and outputs. The inclusion of nongovernmental stakeholders adds
an important dimension to these dynamics. Such stakeholders have specialized
knowledge that allows them to provide insights into problem-solving for
particular issues. Moreover, the inclusion of stakeholders addresses issues of
participation. Stakeholders play the role of intermediary between agencies and
their larger domestic political constituencies. 290 They also increase the
transparency of both agencies and the ICN to the wider public. 291 To reduce
participation costs, the ICN posts its outputs on the web for public
dissemination. The nongovernmental stakeholders include both developed- and
developing-world participants. This increases the points of contact for norm
diffusion and creates additional buy in of ICN work product outside of
government.
A transnational structure allows stakeholders to provide input into problemsolving and norm creation. ICN stakeholder participation allows
nongovernmental actors an opportunity to participate in a way that heretofore
has been unavailable to them in other international antitrust institutions. The
ICN requires an invitation for nongovernmental advisers to participate. Though
this presents a form of club membership, most agencies eagerly accept
stakeholder participation. A number of developing-world nongovernmental
agencies (NGAs) participate in the groups and attend the annual conferences.
The perception by agencies and nongovernmental stakeholders is that NGA
participation has improved the work product of the ICN.

290. Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Global Governance, Participationand the Public Sphere, 39
Gov'T & OPPOSITION 314 (2004).
291. Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Assessing the Democratic Quality of Deliberation in
International Governance: Criteria and Research Strategies, 40 ACTA POLITICA 368 (2005); Jan Aart
Scholte, Civil Society and DemocraticallyAccountable Global Governance, 39 GOV'T & OPPOSITION

211 (2004).
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The strength of a transnational forum is that it overcomes some of the
weakness of traditional antitrust agency decision making. Traditional domestic
administrative law has not been able to create "a normative model that builds
on best practices in an administrative world beset by inadequate budgets,
legislative imperatives, and public resistance, as well as real scientific
uncertainties." 292 The ICN has begun to address some of these concerns
internationally. The ICN opens the administrative model to input from a broad
spectrum different stakeholders both domestically and internationally. It
thereby receives the latest thinking across jurisdictions to assist agencies in
selling antitrust enforcement in their domestic jurisdictions. This serves at once
to police agencies even as it creates reputational effects to encourage
compliance.
d. Dynamics of the International Competition Network
i. Virtual Operation
The second element to the ICN that makes it more effective vis-A-vis other
institutional alternatives is that the ICN operates as a virtual organization. This
gives it flexibility to grow and to address new issues as they emerge within
antitrust policy circles. There is no permanent staff. All participants have fulltime jobs in government, academia, NGOs, or the private sector. This creates a
sense of ownership of ICN work product from government and nongovernment stakeholders because of their involvement in the work product.
This virtual nature requires sophistication in coordination and decision making.
A steering committee of agencies makes ICN decisions. Steering committee
293
members and heads of working groups are all domestic antitrust officials.
The ICN has geographic balance as well as some representation by developingworld countries, increasing participation and accountability of agencies of
various sizes and levels of economic development. The steering committee
guides the ICN by helping set the agenda for discussion and establishing the
working groups.

2 94

ii. Action-oriented Agenda
The ICN does not seek to understand particular subjects for its own sake of
study. Its purpose is to create consensus and adopt antitrust norms. The ICN
does not require increased formalism in terms of specific harmonized
292. Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering:In Search of the Law-Science Problem, 66 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 153 (2003).
293. Current members of the steering committee include Canada, the European Commission,
France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland,
and the United States.
294. ICN, ICN OperationalFramework, adopted June 25, 2003 in Mrida, Mexico, availableat
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/operational-framework3.pdf.
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standards. In this sense the ICN has a different institutional capability than
either the OECD or UNCTAD. These other organizations can study contentious
issues for the very reason that they are not results-oriented organizations. Their
in-depth analyses of controversial topics uncover the rationale behind the
substantive differences among members. Over time, this potentially allows for
a synthesis of ideas that can overcome concerns with shared norms.
Soft law regulatory cooperation works best where coordination is important
but the substance is not. 295 Fighting anticompetitive mergers and cartels
requires coordination, and coordination entails operational transaction costs.
The ICN has been successful in its endeavors because its limited agenda thus
far has focused on reducing the transaction costs of coordination through
adoption of better practices. The ICN has purposely chosen to address only
those areas of law where success is likely.
This agenda contrasts with the international antitrust transgovernmental
organizations. Regardless of progress, their bureaucracies may support
continuing function of transgovernmental organizations, which may continue to
put out work product even if it has no immediate effect upon their members.
Over the long term, this depth of knowledge can bring forth new initiatives and
perhaps slowly develop consensus on various issues. In contrast, if the ICN is
not able to apply its learning to policy prescriptions, it is no longer effective in
the purpose for which it was created. This is an issue as networks suffer from
the possibility of decay.2 96 If the members' commitment to the ICN weakens
(particularly the United States' and EU's commitment), the institution also
weakens. 297 Because the cost of harmonization for substantive disagreements in
antitrust may be high, taking on such issues within the ICN may reduce its
momentum to identify problems and implement solutions that encourage
domestic compliance.29 8
e. Harmonization at the International Competition Network
The ICN attempts to capture the best practices of regulatory diversity and
295. David Zaring, Informal Procedure,Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministration, 5 CHI. J.
INT'L L 547 (2005).

296. Budzinski, supranote 249, at 50.
297. Mariana Bode & Oliver Budzinski, Competing Ways Towards InternationalAntitrust: The
WTO versus the ICN, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS INANTITRUST, supra note 1, at 21.
298. Id. In May 2006, the ICN set up a working group on unilateral conduct to cover issues of
dominance/monopolization, co-headed by the United States and Germany. One senior DOJ official
described the difference between EU and US approaches to dominance as "Europeans are gentlemen.
Americans are cowboys." J. Bruce McDonald, Section 2 and Article 82: Cowboys and Gentlemen,
College of Europe Global Competition Law Centre, The Modernisation of Article 82, Second Annual
Conference, Brussels (June 16-17, 2005); see also Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust
Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343
(2004). The lack of substantive consensus between the two main supporters in the ICN may frustrate the
ability of ICN participants to achieve progress in this area. Lack of progress on unilateral conduct may
lead to increased inertia on the part of the ICN.
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the benefits of greater international cooperation. There is a three-step process
toward antitrust convergence in this context. The first step involves
decentralized experimentation at the national or regional levels. The second
step is the identification of superior approaches. The final step involves a
process of harmonization by the adoption of the superior approaches by
299
Under this approach, greater cooperation is not the
individual jurisdictions.
end result. Instead, coordination and cooperation are necessary steps increased
harmonization based on best practices.
The adopted standards are the so-called best and recommended practices.
These provisions are benchmarks rather than substantive criteria. The ICN
claims that it does not seek to create mandatory harmonization. One ICN report
states:
It is important to stress that the ICN does not seek any "top down" harmonisation of
competition law and policies throughout the world. It not only lacks the competence
to do so, but more fundamentally takes the view that any attempt at wholesale
harmonisation would do injustice to the great diversity of the economic,
institutional, legal and cultural settings prevalent in the home jurisdictions of its
member agencies. This diversity is an important source of inspiration when
comparing various solutions to competition issues developed in one or the other
jurisdiction. If and when such a comparison helps to identify the most convincing
whether its home
approach, it is up to each individual agency to consider
30 0
jurisdiction might benefit from following such benchmarks.

Harmonization at the ICN allows for flexibility. Harmonization in this
context suggests adoption of better practices within a band of possible options
depending on the particular experience of and situations within a country.
Harmonization does not imply uniformity.
On the one hand, since ICN practices are not binding, this preserves the
domestic choices of countries to pursue policies that their agencies decide
upon. However, on the other hand, there is a soft coercive element to ICN
harmonization. As the ICN reaches goals and principles, the decision and the
modalities for harmonization remain within the control of each individual
country. Cooperation is a first step. For the ICN to be effective there must be
some benchmarking and identification of best practices. This is a system that
paradoxically fosters diversity in stock taking in order to limit that diversity. A
decentralized system of cooperation without30harmonization does not facilitate
the adoption of superior norms and practices. 1
299. See Timothy J. Muris, Competition Agencies in a Market-Based Global Economy (Brussels,
Belgium, July 23, 2002) (prepared remarks at the Annual Lecture of the European Foreign Affairs
Review), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723/brussels.htm.
300. ICN, A Statement of Mission & Achievements up Until May 2005 2 (2005) (emphasis added).
301. William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy Cooperationand the Pursuit of Better Practices,in
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AMID DIsCORD 66, 68 (David
M. Andrews, Mark A. Pollock, Gregory C. Shaffer & Helen Wallace eds., 2005); Muris, supra note 301.
In the European experience, harmonization worked through the creation of best practices in the EU
context. The experiences of national agencies created the foundation for Community wide competition
law. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
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As more agencies adopt ICN principles, and in particular as the major
jurisdictions do, a bandwagoning effect begins. 30 2 The ICN allows regulatory
diversity at the first level. However, in the second level, it erodes some
diversity by creating norms or standards. Agency preferences may change as
the agency feels that it has no choice but to agree to the framework of3 a3
majority of agencies, particularly of agencies that wield significant power. 0
There are financial repercussions (technical assistance) and social repercussions
(peer perception) that push agencies to bandwagon. Agencies thus make these
norms their own even if benchmarking requires a change in their structure or
behavior. 304 Such behavior is desirable when, as a result of changes in
economic thinking, 3agencies
adopt improved practices that work within their
5
larger legal systems. 0
f. Operational Functions of the International Competition Network
There are three stages to the development of norms at the ICN. In the first
stage, the steering group identifies an issue for study. At the second stage, a
working group studies the issue. Through the course of the study, the working
group determines those aspects of the issue that are suitable for harmonization
and identifies ways to reach a more effective regulatory outcome. In the third
stage, the working group presents its findings, and the ICN begins to implement
the core practices they imply. At this final stage, an ICN working group focuses
its output on the creation of templates, manuals, and other products that
facilitate implementation.
The ICN consists of a number of working groups. Each working group
covers an important issue in antitrust. The working groups have created better
operational strategies for cooperation and coordination. In other cases, the
working groups have created common ideas and best practices which have
become the basis of implementation strategies for member countries. The
steering group has established subgroups in each of these working groups to
focus on more specific issues.
The subgroups of each working group prepare a number of different
outputs. These include recommended practices, best practices, and manuals to
help operationalize across jurisdictions the handling of cases and pursuit of
enforcement. The subgroups produce reports, many of which include empirical
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998).

302. On bandwagoning, see generally ROBERT POWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF POWER: STATES AND
STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?InternationalNorms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 706 (2006).
303. LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2001).
304. In other circumstances, these changes require a change in domestic legislation. The ICN can
serve as a policy lever to help enact this legislation.
305. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000).
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data not previously collected in the aggregate from antitrust agencies. These
reports survey thinking on various issues and offer new insights on ways to
harmonize practices and approaches. Outputs also include templates for
thresholds,6 procedures across countries, databases of information, and
30
toolkits.
The ICN as an institution adopts practices at two levels. Of all its
nonbinding work product, the ICN's recommended practices enjoy widest
approval. These practices have the approval of the entire ICN. Best practices
reflect the steering group's acceptance of subgroup work product but not
formal approval by the entire ICN. To date, only ICN recommended practices
include the work of the merger group.
i. Mergers
ICN efforts have reduced the costs associated with multiple filing systems.
The ICN has increased operational convergence in merger control through the
adoption of recommended and best practices. This has effects on both firms
involved in mergers and on agencies' budgets and time. The merger group's
work has also increased technical assistance on mergers. This includes training
of agencies' staff in the latest techniques of merger investigation and
implementation of guiding principles and best practices.
The merger group contains three subgroups: Notification and Procedures,
Analytical Framework, and Investigative Techniques. The Notifications and
Procedures subgroup has created merger templates based on each jurisdiction's
standards for merger control. This easily available list provides increased
certainty for businesses and their counsel, thereby reducing the risk and
potential costs of a merger. One of the main outputs of the Notification and
Procedures subgroup has been a common framework to begin to reduce the
differences across jurisdictions in the procedures and processes of merger
control. The ICN membership created a set of Eight Guiding Principles for
Merger Notification and Review Procedures. These include: (i) sovereignty; (ii)
transparency; (iii) nondiscrimination; (iv) procedural fairness; (v) efficient,
timely, and effective review; (vi) coordination; (vii) convergence; and (viii)
protection of confidential information. 307 Along with these principles, the
Notification and Procedures subgroup identified recommended practices for
merger control. The adoption of these practices by member agencies creates
opportunities for more efficient merger control across jurisdictions. The greater
efficiency should reduce the amount of time and uncertainty involved in global
merger control. Indeed, it already has begun to do so.
The ICN has adopted practices that working group members acknowledged

306. ICN, supra note 300, at 3.
307.

ICN, Guiding Principlesfor Merger Notificationand Review Procedures(2002).
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and identified as best practices in merger control. These recommended
practices include: (1) sufficient nexus between the transaction's effects and the
reviewing jurisdiction; (2) clear and objective notification thresholds; (3)
flexibility in the timing of merger notification; (4) merger review periods; (5)
requirements for initial notification; (6) conduct of merger investigations; (7)
procedural fairness; (8) transparency; (9) confidentiality; (10) interagency
coordination; (11) remedies; (12) competition agency powers; and (13) review
of merger control provisions. 308 Best practices include a broad statement and an
explanatory comment to articulate each of these general themes. This allows
enough flexibility in approach to accommodate different legal backgrounds,
traditions and socioeconomic structures.
The recommended merger practices have not met with the sort of
nonresponse typical for many nonbinding recommendations from other soft law
organizations. In fact, there has been considerable implementation of these
practices. This is not to suggest that all countries have implemented ICN
recommended practices. Rather, a substantial number have done so. More
agencies plan to adopt them going forward as they change their domestic laws
to accommodate these practices.
Thus far, 54 percent of ICN members have made or plan to make revisions
to their merger regimes to comply with the recommended practices. 309 Private
sector studies corroborate agencies' progress in conforming to the
recommended practices. According to these studies, no jurisdiction was
completely inconsistent with all three recommended practices. Nearly 90
percent of all jurisdictions were partially consistent with all three practices,
though only six at that time were substantially consistent with all three
recommended practices. In the aggregate, over one third of the jurisdictions
were substantially consistent with at least one recommended practice. 310
Though in the aggregate compliance has been high, compliance seems to have
been higher in countries with stronger antitrust systems. 3 11 Not surprisingly,
those countries more open to international mergers are those most likely to
implement changes to increase the certainty of merger control in these
jurisdictions. Conformity also may be due to political economy reasons such as

308. ICN, Recommended Practicesfor Merger Notification and Review Procedures (2005). The
final two recommended practices were added in 2005.
309. Julie Soloway, The FourthAnnual InternationalCompetition Network Conference: Continued
Progress Toward Convergence,INT'L ANTITRUST BULL., Fall/Summer 2005, at 14, 14-15.
310. A designation of partially consistent could include a variation of "full consistency with some,
and complete or partial inconsistency with other, component elements of each Recommended Practice."
J William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the InternationalCompetition Network's
Recommended Practicesfor MergerNotification Procedures:FinalReport, 5 BUs. L. INT'L 11, 111-12
(2004).
311. J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN's Recommended Merger
Practices:A Work-in-(Early)-Progress,ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, at 1-2.
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resources and trade openness. 3 12 Widespread conformity to at least some
aspects of the recommended practices is an important first step where there had
been little previous implementation in this area among agencies.
Another subgroup, Merger Investigation and Analysis, focuses on analytic
techniques and methods to improve the quality of merger investigations. This
has included work on an analysis of merger guidelines. This subgroup's work
product analyzes the substantive standards of merger guidelines in various
competition systems. Merger group inquiry into specific investigative
techniques and approaches allows the ICN to implement its recommended
practices across jurisdictions. This in turn increases norm diffusion and adds to
operational issues an implementation element that other international soft law
for a lack.
Merger Investigation and Analysis covers market definition, unilateral
effects, coordinated effects, entry barriers and expansion, and efficiencies. 313 A
related project creates an analytical baseline standard for an Investigative
Techniques Handbook.314 The handbook offers a common framework for
enforcers to use in undertaking merger investigation and analysis. It provides a
way for agencies to increase the efficiency of their techniques and results. The
framework also addresses issues of substantive convergence. The framework
creates a foundation for substantive practices and provides a clearer sense of
the types of behavior that match substantive standard benchmarks for merger
analysis.
In many cases, ICN recommendations are quite similar to earlier OECD or
BIAC recommendations. 315 Wide implementation of its merger
recommendations begs the question of why the ICN has succeeded where other
soft law institutions have failed. What seems to have distinguished the ICN's
efforts from earlier OECD merger recommendations is that in developing the
ICN's recommendations, the private sector worked intimately with the agencies
in creating a framework that is functional from a business standpoint. The ICN
model addresses business groups' interest in reducing transaction costs for
business and improving legal certainty in the process and application of merger
control. Furthermore, stakeholders in the merger group have increasingly

312. Simon J. Evenett & Alexander Hijzen, Conformity with InternationalRecommendations on
Merger Reviews: An Economic Perspective on 'Soft Law' (Univ. of Nottingham, Research Paper No.
2006/04, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-893034.
313. ICN, ANALYSIS OF MERGER GUIDELINES (2004).
314. ICN, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES HANDBOOK FOR MERGER REVIEW (2005).

315. ICN dynamics demonstrate that the competition created by multiple international antitrust
organizations spurs innovation in other organizations as each institution responds to developments in the
others. The OECD responded to the ICN's Recommended Practices by issuing its own Recommendation
Concerning Merger Review. The OECD Recommendation includes many of the same types of practices
as the ICN recommendations. This may be a case of mutually reinforcing recommendations. It also may
result from the OECD's desire to continue to be seen as relevant in this area where the ICN has taken the
lead in policy implementation and where previously the OECD monopolized policy initiatives.
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included developing agencies and NGAs. Developing-world stakeholder
participation provides greater credibility to the ICN merger working group, as
well as broad experience to draw upon and diverse voices in the creation of
common approaches. Likewise, the virtual nature has increased the points of
norm diffusion and created increased buy in as ICN participants take ownership
of the group's work product.
ii. Cartels
The cartel working group has increased harmonization of laws and
approaches to combat cartels. The ICN has organized cartel workshops for
agencies. In these workshops, agencies review techniques, compare
enforcement strategies, and increase their capacity to undertake cartel work.
These workshops provide agencies an opportunity to compare effective
practices against international cartels. One important work product by the
cartels group has been its analytical treatment in defining cartel enforcement.
This work also includes analytical treatment of instructions and penalties for
316
cartel enforcement.
The cartel working group has authored a manual on anticartel enforcement
techniques. The manual has helped agencies to identify better practices in
investigation and enforcement techniques and to examine and improve existing
practices. The manual and templates create benchmarks for techniques and
practices. These outputs facilitate the ability of agencies to follow enforcement
norms that reduce the costs of investigations while improving their results.
Additionally, the cartel group has examined substantive issues in cartel
enforcement that have practical effects. These issues include overcoming
obstruction of investigations by defendants and the contexts in which private
cartel enforcement can aid public enforcement. Similarly, cartel work has
created changes in antitrust policy in a push for leniency. As a result of efforts
in the ICN, a number of countries have moved to incorporate leniency
programs. For example, in 2003, Australia, Brazil, and Japan each modified
their antitrust systems to encourage leniency. 317 Other countries also have
revised their antitrust laws based on ICN cartel group recommendations.
iii. Market Access
The ICN has not yet included international trade and antitrust interface

316. ICN WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, supranote 56.
317. Leniency may be critical to uncovering and prosecuting cartels and to reducing the stability of

other cartels. Leniency provides agencies with inside evidence of cartel activity. This reduces the cost of
detecting cartels. When a leniency program is in place, this may also serve to destabilize other cartels
because it increases the benefits of defection from the cartel for the first mover who applies for leniency.
See ICN, DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE LENIENCY PROGRAM (2006); John M. Connor,
Global Antitrust Prosecutionsof Modern InternationalCartels,4 J. INDUSTRY, COMPETITION, & TRADE
239 (2004).
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issues in its agenda. This limits the role that the ICN could play in creating a
common understanding of market access issues. It may be that because of the
contentiousness of the market access issue, both among developed countries
and between developing and developed countries, discussion of it would cause
a slowdown in ICN outputs. Given that there is no permanent bureaucracy
within the ICN, its lack of movement toward an understanding of market access
and the creation and implementation of best practices for market access have
the potential to derail the organization. Without results in market access, ICN
members might stop committing resources to study this issue. This might have
spillover effects on other ICN work. At the level of agency participation, the
ICN faces the problem that the United States and EU will put fewer efforts into
the ICN if this or another issue creates an impasse. Without EU and U.S.
support, the ICN will lose momentum and relevance. The United
States seems
318
terms.
U.S.
on
is
it
unless
access
market
address
to
unwilling
Market access is an area in which business support may be mixed. This
contrasts with mergers, where the business community has provided significant
input. To a lesser extent, business has a stake in ICN work on cartels. MNCs
facing market access issues have an interest in ensuring that the ICN does not
reach consensus at the lowest common denominator and that consensus does
not stymie procompetitive behavior. Business may be relevant to engage in
market access debate if this is the potential outcome. Academic support on
market access is also mixed due to different approaches that academics take to
antitrust, as exemplified in the debate on whether efficiency should be the only
goal of antitrust.
C. The Market as an Institution

The market is itself an institution that regulates conduct. Any comparative
institutional analysis that excludes the market would be incomplete. More
formal institutions may not be necessary when the market effectively
disciplines behavior better than other institutions. However, markets may
malfunction in a number of ways. Antitrust is a regulatory response to such
failures. Specifically, antitrust responds to a market failure in which the
exercise of monopoly power by one or more actors creates a misallocation of
resources. 319 If markets functioned efficiently without exploitation, there would
be no need for antitrust.
If left entirely to producers, prices would reflect a price higher than the
competitive price. When producers can limit the entry of competitors on their
own or collude with competitors to set prices higher than a competitive rate of
318. As the previous historical discussion reveals, both the United States and EU need to be in
agreement before any issue has the chance for effective implementation.
319. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost of Perfect
Competition Still HauntsAntitrust, 1 J.COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 21, 23 (2005).
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return where price exceeds marginal cost, this exposes a gap in the market's
ability as an institution to yield optimal results. It is because of this exploitation
that countries create some level of market regulation through antitrust laws and
institutions. Markets also may malfunction where firms can use increased
globalization to participate in anticompetitive activities around the world
through exercise of monopoly power. As the previous discussion on the
problems of international antitrust shows, a weakness of the market is that it
may not easily self-correct against anticompetitive spillover or market access
malfunctions.
An argument can be made that a reduction in trade barriers could allow
markets to self-correct for the problems of international antitrust. 320 As
countries have uncovered more cartels operating internationally, this thinking
has begun to change. A contestable market through trade openness may have
limits in its ability to self-regulate against cartels. Even jurisdictions with the
greatest trade openness (for example, Hong Kong and Singapore) have had to
put antitrust laws in place to combat hard-core cartels. 32 1 As the previous
discussion on cartels illustrated, the evidence of international cartels shows that
countries without anticartel laws suffer larger overcharges than countries with
antitrust regimes.
With respect to mergers, the market may not be as effective as other more
formal legal institutions at correcting mergers with international
anticompetitive implications. If firms could merge at will across borders, they
would strive to gain monopoly power in order to raise prices and reap richer
profits. It should come as no shock that firms will pay more for a privatized
company when they can buy a monopoly position. 322 Furthermore, without
merger review, a country loses the means to participate in mergers that may
have significant implications on its domestic economy. Mergers in particularly
concentrated markets, in which there may be incredibly high market shares,
have greater potential to affect competition in that market. Imagine the
competitive effects, for example, of merger between two global cellular
telecommunications companies with holdings in highly concentrated markets
across a region.
In this hypothetical, one nation in the region lacks merger control, which
prevents it from considering the competitive effects on its consumers in the
cellular telecommunications market. Because of the importance of
telecommunications to a country's infrastructure and development, such effects
could have profound implications on the country's global competitiveness.
320. Bruce M. Owen, Competition Policy in Latin America 8 (Stanford Law Sch. Olin Program in
at
2003),
available
No.
268,
Working
Paper
Economics,
Law
and
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=456441.
321. See Singapore Competition Act of 2004; Justine Lau, Hong Kong Body Backs Anti-trust
Shake-up, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at 7.

322. OECD, supra note 124, at 8.
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Without merger review, there is no ex-ante opportunity to remedy possible
anticompetitive conduct. Though the market could self-correct upon entry of
another firm (in pursuit of profits above the competitive level), the previous
discussion on barriers to entry and the Telmex decision suggests that market
access barriers may limit the ability of the market to self-correct appropriately.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Effectiveness ofInstitutions
This Article demonstrates that there are flaws in each of the existing
institutions, domestic and international, which address the issues of
international antitrust. No one institution solves each of the malfunctions that
affect international antitrust completely. However, soft law international
organizations may be the least problematic institutional alternative for
addressing international antitrust concerns generally. In particular, the ICN is
more effective than any other soft law institution. Such institutions have lower
participation costs than do their hard law alternatives. Moreover, they are more
effective in their ability to overcome the problems of international antitrust than
are purely domestic institutions.
323
The design of international organizations affects institutional outcomes.
Once parties choose a regime, it becomes more difficult to change it as the
regime becomes path-dependent. Indeed, international organizations foster
increased path dependency. 324 Therefore, it is important to undertake a costbenefit analysis to make sure that an international regime is worthwhile.
Otherwise, the long-term cost of an institution may be significant and exceed
that of other institutional choices.
The goal of comparative institutional analysis is to create a system that is
effective, where the benefits outweigh the costs. Not all systems have effective
participation by actors. The diagram below provides the ranges of participation
and effectiveness of institutions.

323. Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supranote 161.
324. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
Organizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1998).

Through Formal International
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Effective
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IV

Participatory

Nonparticipatory

II

III
Ineffective

The optimal institutions are those in quadrant I. These institutions have a
high level of meaningful participation by actors domestically and
internationally. The next best institutional type is in quadrant IV. Such
institutions are effective in their outcomes, a function of the benefits of
participation. However, they have problems with participation, a function of the
costs of participation. Institutions that have high costs and low benefits but high
levels of participation fall within quadrant II. The institutions that have all of
the worst possible attributes are in quadrant III-ineffective institutions with
low levels of participation.
International antitrust issues are complex. The appropriate institutions to
address them must account for the global nature of the problem. Once global
institutions play a role, this reduces the level of participation by domestic
actors. By their nature, global institutions are less accountable than their
domestic counterparts, and they entail increased costs of participation. Put
differently, there are questions of participation and legitimacy to international
antitrust institutions. No international institution has strong democratic
legitimacy. Instead, by their nature, supranational institutions suffer in this
325
International organizations are farther from voter preferences than
regard.
domestic alternatives and the market. This increases the costs of participation in
these organizations to those with significant financial resources. Even on the
domestic level, institutions become less participatory as the complexity of
issues they deal with increases. None of the current international antitrust

325.
(2004).

Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2020-22
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institutions fit within quadrant I. Each of the international institutions discussed
in this Article fit somewhere in quadrant IV. None is fully effective.
Domestic institutions, such as the legislature, courts, and administrative
agencies, have greater participation but alone are less effective for international
antitrust issues. They exist within quadrant II. As the soft law international
institutions become more effective, they empower purely domestic institutions.
The implementation of soft law norms from international organizations occurs
at the domestic level. Domestic and international antitrust institutions move
together and operate dynamically. 326 International institutions become more
effective as they improve the capacity of domestic agencies and vice versa.
B. Final Thoughts on InstitutionalResponses to the Problems of International
Antitrust

Market access remains a significant distortion that the market seems unable
to self-correct. Thus far, domestic and international solutions, whether based on
soft or hard law institutions, have been ineffective in remedying market access
problems. When the transaction costs are high and the potential payoff is
unclear, countries may not even attempt to negotiate an agreement. This makes
hard law more likely to be ineffective in such situations. This may be the lesson
of the market access negotiations in the antitrust and trade interface at the
WTO. Moreover, in the market access area, soft law through the OECD or
UNCTAD has proven ineffective in creating norms thus far to promote better
compliance mechanisms, because the costs of substantive intellectual
convergence remain high.
As a preliminary step, addressing market access concerns from an antitrust
perspective requires increased analytical convergence on the antitrust side as to
the appropriate conceptualization of market access problems. The second step
would be to bridge antitrust and trade conceptualizations on market access.
This would call for a reconsideration of whether trade remedies for market
access problems that affect both antitrust and international trade can ever be
reconciled. Given that the WTO has dropped competition policy from its
current round of negotiations, to start up this discussion again within the WTO
would be premature. Moreover, current WTO adjudication lacks the in-depth
competition analysis
that antitrust practitioners undertake in their domestic
327
adjudications.
In the long term, PTAs may be a way to bridge the gap in thinking on
market access at the WTO. Some antitrust chapters with binding dispute

326. When countries take domestic responses, it is unclear how much of such responses is a
function of a purely domestic approach to international antitrust.
327. There is need for further work on how best to reconfigure the WTO to achieve procompetitive
goals that pass muster under both trade and antitrust regimes.
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resolution provide trade remedies for antitrust violations. They may provide the
tools and structures to ensure that adjudications address both trade and antitrust
concerns successfully. Future PTAs may include specific standards of review
or mandate that antitrust experts serve as panelists for violations under antitrust
provisions. To the extent that such experiments provide an example of the
effectiveness of this approach, they may help build international consensus to
include antitrust dispute settlement as part of a future round of WTO
negotiations. This may lead to binding rules for market access concerns in
antitrust. This process may even have long-term effects of putting economics
back into the practice of international economic law, including in the area of
antidumping. 328 Since no cases have yet concluded with decisions utilizing
antitrust chapters in any PTA, this remains a theoretical discussion.
The ICN has not yet attempted to tackle market access concerns. It may
have built up the capacity to engage its various governmental and
nongovernmental stakeholders in addressing procedural market access concerns
such as more effective coordination and consultation. However, the ICN has
not significantly tested its ability to resolve serious disagreements in different
views of antitrust laws. Reliance on the ICN to address market access issues
would thus entail institutional risk. Taking on these concerns could weaken the
effectiveness of the ICN overall. However, even with its inherent risks, the ICN
seems the least unattractive alternative, certainly better than inaction, at least
for procedural issues. That is, the benefit of action, given the scope of the
market access problem, suggests that the benefits outweigh the potential costs,
even if the ICN does nothing more than improve procedural concerns in the
antitrust and trade interface.
Soft law international organizations have played an effective role in
addressing a number of mergers and cartel issues. Soft law antitrust institutions
show that it is possible for agencies to reach a basic operational consensus,
establish best practices, and implement these practices to improve domestic
institutional capacity for managing mergers and cartels. 329 Participation by
stakeholders seems to play a critical role in the ICN's effectiveness in creating
compliance among them. Of all the international institutions discussed in this
Article, the process of bottom-up harmonization and domestic implementation
exists primarily within the ICN. The ICN does not displace traditional
international institutions as much as it exploits their institutional weaknesses to
328. Antidumping has been a difficult issue for antitrust because antidumping has a more relaxed

threshold for competitive harm. Alan 0. Sykes, Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each
Address?, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 1 (Robert Z. Lawrence ed., 1998). Some scholars have
suggested anti-dumping injury to be based on antitrust principles. See, e.g., Diane Wood, 'Unfair' Trade
Injury: A Competition-BasedApproach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (1996).
329. This supports general theories within the international relations literature which suggest that
compliance will be more likely where there is consensus to norms. Edith Brown Weiss, Concluding
Remarks, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 542 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).

HeinOnline -- 4 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 121 2007

NORMS

IN THE

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 4.1, 2007

address issues of implementation. The ICN represents the best international
institution to push forward an agenda of consensus, better practices, and
implementation on mergers and cartels. It is therefore best suited to push
implementation of international antitrust more generally.
The OECD's strength is in its quasi-academic work and high-level
meetings among top enforcers. The OECD's best output relative to other
institutions is academic in terms of in-depth discussions of issues. It should
focus on in-depth investigation of antitrust issues, through various reports and
discussions, to build analytical consensus. Its use of peer reviews facilitates
domestic change toward improving the quality of domestic antitrust systems
and institutions. This is a gradual process of change but one in which the input
of time and resources may be worth the output of consensus on how to increase
allocative efficiency. Technical assistance that the OECD, its member
countries, and the UNCTAD provide will improve the capacity of younger, less
experienced agencies to implement best practices. The UNCTAD's future role
should address its quasi-political strength. The UNCTAD can continue to draw
attention to the needs of developing countries and agencies. Without the
UNCTAD, the participation of many of the least developed nations in antitrust
would likely be insignificant.
The ICN institutional choice permits a cost-benefit allowance that includes
a results-based legitimacy as a function of the participatory model. 330 Resultsbased legitimacy that allows for increased participation can create a more
socially desirable outcome for antitrust issues. To the extent that the ICN can
create improved efficiency and reduce costs, it can overcome its lack of
democratic legitimacy by providing good results. The choice of the ICN
suggests
that
international
agency-to-agency
cooperation
with
nongovernmental stakeholder involvement, a virtual structure, and participation
of stakeholders in both the developed and developing world present fewer and
less severe malfunctions than purely domestic adjudicatory responses, the
political process, the market, international hard law adjudication, or
transgovernmental cooperation in antitrust. The ICN can facilitate achievement
of important goals in international antitrust. In other words, reaching these
goals is a question of institutional choice. The proper choice of institutions to
address goals provides a rich set of policy prescriptions for international
33 1
antitrust concerns and potentially other areas of international regulatory law.

330. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the SupranationalScale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1517 (2006).
331. For example, in securities law the response in transgovemmental. Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E.
Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches,
Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1999).
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